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"Few rules in our time are so well established that they may not 
be called upon any day to justify their existence as means 
adapted to an end. " 
Benjamin N. Cardozo*** 
IN'rn.ODUCTION 
New domestic and international funds transfer statutes have been 
adopted, but there is no generally accepted understanding of the purpose-
of these laws even though they govern the movement of roughly two 
trillion dollars eveiy day.2 This Article puts forth a theory of funds 
transfer law, arguing that it should serve the interests of participants in 
domestic and international financial markets and contribute to the growth 
and development of internationally competitive financial centers.3 This 
theory is articulated through an inverted pyramid consisting of funds 
transfer law, funds transfer systems, clearing and settlement arrangements, 
and trading activity.4 This theory represents a departure from the 
traditional legal approach to fmancial markets, which focuses on 
*** BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATIJRE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 98 (1921). 
1 
"'Rmds transfer' means the series of transactions, beginning With the originator's 
payment order, made for the pmpose of making payment to the beneficialy of the order:' 
U.C.C. § 4A-104(a) (1990). All citations to the U.C.C. refer to the 1990 Official Text with 
Comments. The version of U.C.C. Article 4A cited to herein is the version that was approved 
by the American Law Institute ("ALfj and the National Conference of Commissioners on 
Unifonn State Laws (''NCCUSL") in 1989. Jnfonnation on state enactment is provided by 
NCCUSL. 
z See infra" note 6. 
3 See infra notes 6-35 and accompanying text 
4 See infra Figure 1, at p. 355. 
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securities regulation and banking law to the exclusion of critical 
commercial law matters such as funds transfers.5 
I. FiNANCIAL MARKETS, FuNDs 'TRANSFER LAW, 
AND TilE INvERTED PYRAMID 
This Article is about how and why big money moves in the world of 
high finance. It highlights a relationship between wire transfer law and 
financial markets that hitherto has been roundly neglected despite the fact 
that two trillion dollars-half of America's gross national product-is 
transferred by wire every day.6 Wire transfer law is unique in that no 
other law affects the movement of so much money. Remarkably, 
however, there is no real jurisprudence of wire transfer law.7 Therefore, 
two basic questions have yet to be addressed. What purposes should wire 
transfer law serve? Does wire transfer law serve its articulated purposes? 
This Article examines the theoretical and policy considerations that the 
first issue presents. The second issue, which is addressed in a companion 
article, 8 involves a critical analysis of specific wire transfer rules and 
logically follows the development of a theory in response to the first 
ISSUe. 
5 See infra text accompanying notes 27-30. 
6 Uniform Commercial Code (''U.C.C.'') Article 4A, U.C.C. art. 4A (1990), governs 
the electronic transfer of roughly two trillion dollars of "bank credit," see infra, every 
day. ERNEsT T. PATRlKIS, THOMAS C. BAXTER, JR. & RAJ K. BHALA, WIRE TRANSFERS: 
A GuiDE TO U.S. AND INTERNATIONAL LAWS GoVERNING FuNDs TRANSFERS 5-6 (1993) 
[hereinafter PATRlKIS, BAXIER & BHALA]. The United Nations' Model Law on 
Intemational Credit Transfers (''UN. Model Law''), see infra note 13, if enacted by 
national legislatures, will govem the transfer of bank credit denominated in foreign 
currencies that, in dollar tenns, will surely be staggering. Whether the U.N. Model Law 
will govem dollar-denominated transfers in the United States is uncertain. Enactment of 
the U.N. Model Law by Congress or state legislatures seems unlikely given the xecent 
widespread adoption of Article 4A 
The use of the term ''bank credif' is deh"berate, because a funds transfer is most 
definitely not a physical transfer of money or in any way analogous to such a transfer. 
See Fairfax l..eaiy, Jr. & Patricia B. Fcy, A "Systems" Approach to Payment Modes: 
Moving Toward a New Payments Code, 16 U.C.C. L.J. 283, 287 (1984). 
7 In 1977, Professor Scott made this declaration with respect to commercial law 
generally. Hal S. Scott, The Risk Fixers, 91 HAR.v. L. REv. 737 (1978). This Article and 
The Risk Fixers address a similar problem: the existence of a commercial statute in a 
conceptual void. 
1 See Raj Bhala, Paying for the Deal: An Analysis of Wire Transfer Law and 
International Financial Market Interest Groups, 42 KAN. L. REv. (forthcoming 1994) (on 
file with author). 
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This Article argues that the current theoretical void should be filled 
with an inverted pyramid that conceptualizes the relationship between 
wire transfer law and financial mark:ets.9 This inverted pyramid approach 
recognizes a fundamental truth: wire transfer law is important because of 
its relationship to the world of high finance. It is time to explore this 
relationship and consider the issues that it raises. Perhaps the best way to 
understand the importance of the law is to see it through the eyes of the 
primary groups that it affects: in this case, the financial players on Wall 
Street and those in Tokyo, London, Singapore, and other dynamic 
financial centers. 
The need for a conceptual approach is further highlighted by the fact 
that over forty states have adopted a new article on funds transfers10 as 
part of their commercial codes. Moreover, the Federal Reserve has 
promulgated a new funds transfer regulation, 11 the Clearing House 
Interbank Payments System ("CHIPS") ofthe New York Clearing House 
Association (''NYCHA") has adopted new funds transfer rules and 
administrative procedures, 12 and the United Nations has published a new 
Model Law on International Credit Transfers (''U.N. Model Law").13 
Yet, the simple puzzle remains: Why and to whom is funds transfer law 
important?14 
9 See itifra Figure 1, at p. 355. 
10 The tenn "funds transfers" is technically preferable to "wire transfers." "Funds 
transfers" correctly suggests that payment orders may be transmitted electronically, orally, 
or in writing. U.C.C. § 4A-104 cmt. 6 (1990). It is legally incorrect to think of a funds 
transfer as ''money moving through a pipeline." A funds transfer is a transfer of bank 
credit from one account to another. The account holder has a non-possessory personal 
property interest, or chose in action, in the bank account. 
11 Federal Reserve Regulation J, 12 C.F.R. pt. 210, subpt. B (1993). "Fedwire" is the 
funds transfer network owned and operated by Federal Reserve Banks. See 12 C.F.R. § 
210.26(e) (1993) (defining "Fedwire''). 
n NEW YORK CLEARING HOUSE AsS'N, RULES GoVERNING THE CLEARING HOUSE 
INTERBANK PAYMENTS SYSTEM (Aug. 17, 1992); NEW YORK CLEARING HOUSE Ass'N, 
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES: CLEARING HOUSE INTERBANK PAYMENTS SYSTEM 
(CHIPS) (Aug 17, 1992) [bereina.fter collectively CHIPS RULES]. CHIPS is owned and 
operated by the New York Clearing House Association ("NYCHA"). See id.; NEW YoRK 
CLEARING HOUSE Ass'N, CONS1TI1JTION OF THE N.Y. CLEARING HOUSE AsS'N art. I. One 
hundred and twenty-two financial institutions, both U.S. and foreign, are CHIPS members 
or "participants." PATRIKIS, BAXTER & BHALA, supra note 6, at 194. CHIPS and Fedwire 
are the nation's two principal funds transfer systems in tenns of transaction number and 
amount and total dollar volmne. See id. at 5-6. 
13 MODEL LAw ON INT'L CREDIT TRANSFERS, U.N. GAOR, 47th Sess., Supp. No. 17, 
Annex 1, at 48, U.N. Doc. A/47/17 (1992) [hereinafter U.N. MODEL LAW]. 
14 This is not the first time that a dearth of theoxy in the histoty of payments law has 
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The resolution of this puzzle rests on the understanding that the 
principal importance of fonds transfor law is its relationship to financial 
market activity.15 Hence, the underlying aim of this Article is to address 
the need to identify, define, and examine this relationship. 
The new narrow and technical body of statutory :fimds transfer law 
serves, or should serve, a critical macroeconomic purpose: supporting 
growth and development in domestic and international financial markets. 
The financial markets in question are those for (1) foreign excbange,'6 (2) 
short-term money-market instruments, 17 (3) corporate equity and debt 
securities,18 (4) derivative products,19 and (5) interbank borrowing and 
existed See, e.g., Robert Cooter & Edward Rubin, A Theory of Loss Allocation for 
Consumer Payments, 66 TEx. L. REv. 63, 64, 66 (1987) (providing a microeconomic 
basis for the loss allocation rules in Articles 3 and 4 of the U.C.C.). Nonetheless, other 
theories have been based on the U.C.C. alone. Id Most commercial lawyers appreciate 
the larger context in which the Uniform Customs and Practice for Documentmy Credits 
(''UCP'') operates: the UCP supports the international trade of goods because letters of 
credit are the primary payments and credit device in such trade. See INTERNATIONAL 
CHAMBER OF COMMERCE PuB. No. 400 (1983); ANDREAS F. l..oWENFELD, INTERNATION-
AL PRivATE TRADE 101-44 (2ded.1989). Anew revision ofthe UCPisscheduled to take 
effect in 1994. Similarly, federal legislation on credit cards and the recent revisions of 
U.C.C. Articles 3 and 4 are noteworthy because credit cards and checks are significant 
payments methods for consumer goods. But, even the veteran commercial lawyer is likely 
to pause when the issue moves to electronic funds transfers. 
15 As those fmniliar with the fonnat of payment orders are aware, there is no place 
in the fonnat (including the third party infonnation field) in which to specify the pmpose 
of the funds transfer (e.g., whether it is intended to discharge an obligation arising from 
a financial or commercial transaction). However, various studies as well as anecdotal 
evidence clearly point to the critical, direct relationship between financial market activity 
and the use of funds transfers. See infra note 98 and accompanying text. 
15 This is a twenty-four hour, international market for 1rading national currencies. See 
generally RUDI WErSWEILLER, How THE FOREIGN ExCHANGE MARKET WORKS (1990) 
(discussing the histozy and mechanics of the foreign exchange market, currency crises, 
and 1rading practices and strategies). 
17 The "short-tenn money market" is a generic term for the interbank market in 
several distinct, short-tenn instruments, including U.S. Treasmy bills (short-tenn debt 
issued at a discount and redeemed at face value), short-term govemment agency securities 
(e.g., discount notes issued by the Federal National Mortgage Association), commercial 
paper (promissmy notes issued at a discount and redeemed at par value, or paying a fixed 
interest rate), and repurchase agreements or "repos" (the tempormy sale of securities 
subject to an agreement of repurchase where the difference between the sale and 
repurchase prices yields a set interest rate). See FED. REsERVE BANK OF N.Y., A POCKET 
GUIDE TO SELECIED SHORT-TERM INSTRUMENTS OF THE MONEY MARKET (1987). 
11 In other words, the markets for the equity and debt of private issuers. 
19 
"[A] derivative is a financial contract whose value depends on the values of one 
or more underlying assets or indexes of asset values." BOARD OF GoVERNORS OF THE 
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lending.20 These are enormously significant markets in terms of size. The 
foreign excl¥mge market, for example, is the world's largest financial 
market.21 These markets also have significant policy implications. For 
instance, interbank borrowing and lending allow depository institutions 
to meet Federal regulatory reserve requirements and shed excess 
reserves.22 
In highlighting the relationship between funds transfer law and 
international and domestic financial market interests, this Article rejects 
three alternative arguments concerning the purpose of funds transfer law: 
(1) the backstop argument, in which the law is viewed as a safety net for 
private agreements;23 (2) the argument that the law is a response to and 
a cure for unfavorable common law developments;24 and (3) the argument 
that consumer protection is the underlying aim of the law.25 Each of these 
arguments is defective in its own right, and none of them accounts for the 
inextricable link between financial market deals and the use of funds 
transfers to settle the payment obligations generated by these deals.26 
FED. REsERVE SYSTEM, FEDERAL DEPOSIT INS. CORP., & OFFICE OF THE COMPTROlLER 
OF THE CURRENCY, DERNATIVE PRODUCT ACTIVITIES OF COMMERCIAL BANKS 1 (Jan. 
27, 1993) (joint study conducted in response to questions posed by Senator Riegle on 
derivative products) [hereinafter JoiNT DERNATIVES SlUDY]. Derivative instruments 
include futures, options, and swaps. See id., app. m, at 5, 8, 10. 
20 A principal form of interbank lending is the purchase and sale of Federal funds 
("Fed funds") and repurchase agreements ("repos"). Fed ftmds refers to the market ''in 
which commercial banks bozrow and lend excess reserve balances held at the Federal 
Reserve." Charles M. Lucas et al., Federal Funds and Repurchase Agreements, in 
FINANCIAL MARKErs: INSTRUMENTS AND CONCEPTS 9-10 (John R. Brick et a1. eds., 2d 
ed. 1986). Borrowing Fed funds is referred to as a ''purchase" of Fed funds, while lending 
is referred to as a "sale." There is some redundancy in using the tenns "short-term money 
market instruments" and ''interbank bozrowing and lending" because Fed funds and repos 
are short-term instruments and the subject of interbank lending. 
21 J. ORIJN GRABBE, INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL MARKErs 65 (2d ed. 1991). 
21 These requirements are imposed uru:ler Federal Reserve Regulation D, 12 C.F.R. 
pt. 204 (1993). 
23 See infra notes 48-66 and accompanying text 
24 See infra notes 67-91 and accompanying text. 
25 See infra notes 92-111 and accompanying text. 
26 Confusion sometimes exists because ofthe seemingly synonymous use ofthetenns· 
''payment obligation" (or ''payment''), "settlement obligation'' (or "settlement''), and 
"discharge." The distinctions among these tem1s are not clearly drawn in either U.C.C. 
Article 4A or the U.N. Model Law. The payment obligation refers to the obligation of the 
originator to pay the beneficiary and is based on the uru:lerlying contract between those 
two parties-a purchase of commercial paper. When the obligation is satisfied, it is legally 
discharged. U.C.C. § 4A-406 (1990). In contrast, settlement obligations refer more 
specifically to interbank payment obligations-the obligation of a bank that sends a 
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The relationship between funds transfer law and financial markets has 
not yet received any scholarly attention. There have, however, been two 
parallel discussions. One discussion focuses on securities regulation, 
banking law, and, to a lesser extent, commodity law and explores the 
importance ofthese legal regimes to financial market development.27 The 
second discussion focuses on funds transfer law in a vacuum. Although 
the literature largely explains the rules,28 the principles and policies that 
animate the law are not related to the larger issue of financial market 
development. 29 At best, they are seen as responding to problems raised 
by the common law.30 
It is time for the two lines of thought to intersect and to explore the 
role that payments law, specifically funds transfer law, can play in the 
growth and development of internationally competitive financial markets. 
With financial markets rising from Shanghai to Istanbul, this issue is 
particularly timely. Put bluntly, when policy advisors from the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund and the World Bank work with Chinese leaders to 
establish a modem electronic payments system, they do not simply 
connect telex lines among banks. Rather, they connect fiber-optic cables 
among banks and the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges. Critical 
to the success of these emerging financial markets-and to the continued 
competitiveness of the markets in New York, Tokyo, London, and the 
other established financial centers-ru'e the legal aspects of settling 
payment obligations generated by financial transactions. 
The argument of this Article is premised on an "interest-group 
approach'' to funds transfer law. Understanding why the law matters 
initially requires an identification of whom the law affects and an evalua-
tion of the relationship between the aims of the affected parties and the 
payment order to pay the receiving bank for that order. Id. § 4A-402. 
27 The focus on soourities regulation and banking law is understandable because these 
bodies of law bear an obvious relation to financial markets. Ironically, though, much of 
the writing along this line is by bankers and economists, not lawyers. See, e.g., HERvE 
DB CARMOY, GLOBAL BANKING STRA1EGY: FINANCIAL MARKErs AND INDUSTRIAL 
DECAY 58-92 (1990); ROY C. SMITH, THE GLOBAL BANKERS 191-222, 247-53, 351-80 
(1989); RICHARD O'BRIEN, GLOBAL FINANCIAL INTEGRATION: THE END OF GEOGRAPHY 
17-28 (1992). 
21 See generally PATRIKIS, BAXTER & BHALA, supra note 6 (discussing laws that 
govern funds transfers). 
29 There has been some work on the relationship of funds transfer law to other bodies 
of law. See, for example, Thomas Baxter & Raj Bhala, The Interrelationship of Article 
4A with Other Law, 45 Bus. LAw. 1485 (1990). 
30 See infra notes 48-111 and accompanying text. 
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operation of the law. Within the community of commercial and invest-
ment banks that dominate the markets for foreign exchange, short-term 
instruments, corporate securities, derivative products, and interbank 
lending, three specific interest groUps must be recognized: (1) traders, (2) 
settlements departments in the financial institutions, and (3) funds transfer 
systems employed by these institutions.31 Funds transfer law must be seen 
primarily through the eyes ofthe traders who monitor Reuters screens for 
movements in exchange rates, interest rates, and securities prices. The 
split-second decisions of these traders to buy and sell foreign currencies, 
short-term money market instruments, equity and debt securities, and 
derivative instruments give rise to the payment obligations that are 
candidates for settlement through funds transfers. The traders' settlements 
departments, or back offices, must then execute their payment instruc-
tions. If a funds transfer is the vehicle to transfer bank credit, then a 
funds transfer system must be used by the back offices. Funds transfer 
law will ·better serve its macroeconomic purpose if it meets the interests 
of these three parties. 
The four-level inverted pyramid presented in Figure 1 is the 
conceptual device for addressing the relationship betWeen funds transfer 
law and financial markets.32 This is done by identifying relevant groups, 
delineating their interests with respect to funds transfer law, and placing 
the interest groups in a relational context. Funds transfer law is the base 
of the inverted pyramid that should support funds transfer systems, 
clearing and settlement operations, and, ultimately, financial market 
transactions. 
31 Those concerned about the role of commercial banks in this scheme should 
immediately recognize that they populate each of the three interest groups. Traders and 
settlements clerks are employed by commercial banks, and commercial banks participate 
in funds transfer systems. 
32 See infra notes 112-209 and accompanying text (discussing Figure 1 in detail). One 
might question why the metaphor of an inverted pyramid, as opposed to a conventional 
upright pyramid, is appropriate, especially given that the narrow base of an inverted 
pyramid is less stable than the broad base of an upright pyramid! However, the narrow 
base and the increasingly broad body of an inverted pyramid serve an important 
conceptual pmpose by illustrating that funds transfer law-a rather narrow and technical 
body of commercial law-supports a vast mmy of trading activities, clearing and 
settlement operations, and funds transfer systems. The use of an inverted pyramid further 
highlights an important and potential source of instability in the system: changes in 
certain provisions of funds transfer law could have deleterious effects on the financial 
marlcets. 
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Figlll'e 1: The IIIVerled Pyr11mid 
Top Level: TRADING ACI1VITIES. 
Kev players: 
Tradings in the foreign exchange, securities, and money markets. 
Key interests with respect to funds transfer law: 
High speed and low cost. 
Key players: 
Second Level: CLEARING AND 
SETTLEMENT OPERATIONS. 
Settlements department of trading institution (the "back office''). 
Key interests with respect to funds transfer law: 
Certainty as to payment order processing, mishaps, fraud, payment 
finality, and discharge. 
Third Level: FUNDS TRANSFER SYSTEMS. 
Key players: 
Institutions participating in the system and bank regulators. 
Key interests with respect to funds transfer law: 
Ability to vary statute by agreement and accommodation of 
systemic risk reduction efforts. 
Base: FUNDS TRANSFER LAW. 
Rules responsive to traders: 
Same-day execution and consequential 
damage preclusion. 
Rules responsive to settlements departments: 
Reliance on an account nmnber in processing 
payment orders, money-back guarantee, 
security .procedures, receiver finality, and 
discharge. 
Rules responsive to funds transfer systems: 
Variation by agreement, choice of law, 
excejltions to receiver finality. 
355 
The inverted pyramid places the players in a relational context 
relative to each other and to funds transfer law and identifies their 
interests. The reason for identifying the interests of the key players at the 
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top three levels is that these interests must be met by a funds transfer 
statute if the law is to serve its macroeconomic purpose. The jurispru-
dence of funds transfer law is grounded on identifying and satisfying the 
interests of the financial traders, settlements departments, and funds 
transfer syste~. One qualification that should be made at the outset is 
that some of the interests of the players and the funds transfer rules 
responsive to them may be complimentary. For example, the inverted 
pyramid indicates that traders are interested in high speed and low cost 
and that the same-day execution rule and the consequential damage 
preclusion help satisfy these interests. This identification of the trader8' 
interests does not imply that the settlements department lacks any interest 
in high speed or low cost or that it does not benefit from these 
rules-indeed, the contrary is quite likely the case. Rather, the point is to 
theorize about the primary interests and most salient responsive rules with 
respect to each group. 
The remainder of this Article argues that a wire transfer law must 
satisfy the interests it is designed to serve. Through a hypothetical 
transaction, Part II briefly explains that paper-based methods of payment 
are ill-suited to the modem financial marketplace and thereby emphasizes 
the importance of funds transfers to the settlement of financial transac-
tions. 33 Part III critically analyzes and rejects three theoretical positions 
that are potential alternatives to the argument of this Article.34 Part IV 
explores in deiail the relationship . between funds transfer law and 
financial market activity through the inverted pyramid 35 
II. CHEcKS WoN'T WoRK 
The transactions at the top of the inverted pyramid could not occur 
or would be significantly impeded without high speed, low cost, and high 
security funds transfers. The typical user of funds transfer services differs 
markedly from the average drawer of a check. Funds transfers users are 
likely to be large financial institutions and corporations engaging in 
sophisticated financial deals. Their interests are distinct from those of the 
individual who draws a check to pay for a retail or small business 
transaction. In turn, the principles and policies that· inform funds transfer 
law are different from those that pertain to retail payments. 
33 See itifra notes 36-44 and accompanying text. 
34 See itifra notes 45-111 and accompanying text. 
35 See itifra notes 112-209 and accompanying text. 
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Consider a spot U.S. dollar-Malaysian ringgif6 foreign exchange deal 
in which a trader at Citibank ("Citi'') in New York sells ten million 
dollars to a trader at Hongkong Shanghai Bank (''HKSB") in Kuala 
Lumpur in return for the appropriate amount of ringgit, as determined by 
the prevailing market exchange rate. Assume the Citi trader pays for the 
ringgit by mailing a check for ten million dollars drawn on Chemical 
Bank ("Chemical") in New York, the payor bank.37 A security risk 
exists in this situation because the check could be lost or stolen in the 
mails. Suppose that after approximately ten days, the HKSB trader 
receives and deposits the check in a depositary bank, 38 Bank Bumiputra 
(''Bank Bumi") in Kuala Lumpur. Bank Bumi does not give the HKSB 
trader a final credit of ten million dollars, because Chemical, the paying 
bank, might dishonor the check upon presentment.39 Instead, Bank Bumi 
forwards the check for collection to its correspondent, perhaps the Bank 
of America's office in Kuala Lumpur ("BA"), which acts as a collecting 
bank. 40 This adds still a few more days to the process. When Chemical 
finally receives the check from BA, it examines the amount of the check 
relative to the funds available in Citi's correspondent account and will 
dishonor the draft if there are insufficient funds in Citi's correspondent 
account (or if Chemical is unwilling to grant Citi an overdraft).41 If 
Chemical honors the check, then Bank Bumi will give a final credit to the 
HKSB trader's account.42 Any provisional credit given by Chemical to 
BA or by BA to Bank Bumi generates float, thus allowing the bank with 
the credit (but not the HKSB trader) to earn interest on the ten million 
dollars. As the days go by and float accumulates, the HKSB trader may 
miss profitable investment opportunities because of the lack of a final 
credit of ten million dollars. 
36 A "ringgit" is a Malaysian currency. A spot foreign exchange contract involves 
a commitment by one party to deliver a specified quantity of one currency against the 
other party's delivery of a specified quantity of a second currency, generally within two 
business days of the date of the contract. 
37 u.c.c. § 4-105(3) {1990). 
31 Assuming that the U.C.C. is applicable to the events in Kuala Lumpur, U.C.C. § 
4-105(1) {1990) defines the term "bank." Bank Bumi also is a "collecting bank." ld. § 4-
105(5). 
39 Id. § 3-50l{a), {b)(l). 
-40 Id. § 4-105(5). 
~1 More technically, Chemical detennines whether the check is "properly payable." 
Id. § 440l(a). 
42 Assuming that the U.C.C. applies, the final credit to HKSB'saccount would result 
when provisional credits in the check collection chain finn up and become final. Id. §§ 
4-301, 4-302. 
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The laborious and risky process associated with collecting cross-
border, paper-based payment instruments is equally apparent if the 
transaqtion is changed from a spot foreign exchange deal to a purchase 
of stock. Suppose that the Merrill Lynch Dragon Fund (''Dragon Fund"), 
a mutual fund dedicated to investing in Far East equities, elects to 
purchase shares of the Tiger Beer Company (''Tiger''), a Malaysian 
brewery whose stock is listed on the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange."3 
Assume that Dragon Fund purchases the stock through a broker employed 
by Kim Eng Securities ("KES") in Kuala Lumpur. Dragon Fund pays the 
broker in Malaysian ringgit (the currency in which the Tiger shares are 
quoted on the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange) with an international bank 
draft.44 Accordingly, Dragon Fund asks its bank, Chemical Bank 
("Chemical"), to draw a draft in ringgit. Chemical draws the draft on a 
bank in Kuala Lumpur at which Chemical maintains a correspondent 
account denominated in ringgit. Dragon Fund purchases the draft from 
Chemical and mails it to the KES broker. The broker then deposits the 
check in its bank for collection against Chemical. When the broker 
obtains a final credit depends upon the time required for collection. As 
in the first hypothetical, this process takes several days and entails a 
security problem associated with the mails. 
A funds transfer cures these difficulties and makes transactions such 
as those above far more feasible than would be the case if payment 
obligations were settled by check or international bank draft. With a 
funds transfer system, the Citi trader wires ten million dollars to the 
HKSB trader, resulting in a final credit within one or two business days. 
Similarly, using a Malaysian wire transfer system, the Dragon Fund wires 
ringgit to the KES broker, leading to a quick and final payment. The 
features of certainty and celerity are inherent in a funds transfer but not 
in a check or international bank draft. In turn, payment obligations from 
the dollar/ringgit deal and the Tiger stock purchase are impractical, if not 
impossible, to settle if a cross-border paper instrument entailing physical 
collection is used. In the language of the economist, when otherwise 
profitable transactions are inhibited, wealth is not generated and there is 
a dead weight loss. In the world of high finance, time and certainty mean 
money. This is not to say that financial markets would not function 
43 The :marlcet capitalization of the Kuala Lmnpur Stock ExchanglHl measure ofthe 
exchange's significance-now rivals that of Singapore and is approaching that of Hong 
Kong. 
44 An international bank draft utilizes the deposits of a domestic bank denominated 
in a foreign currency and held in a foreign bank. JOHN DOLAN, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL 
CODE: TERMs AND TRANSACTIONS IN COMMERCIAL LAW§ 27.2 (1991). 
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without fim.ds transfer law; clearly, they did for centuries. However, the 
twenty-four-hour global financial markets for foreign exchange, money 
market instruments, interbank lending, corporate securities, and derivative 
products demand more than that which paper-based payment mechanisms 
can provide. 
ill. ALTERNATIVE ExPLANATIONS OF FuNDs 'TRANSFER LAW 
There are primarily three explanations of fimds transfer law. Funds 
transfer law could be conceived of as a "backstop" to private agree-
ments.45 However, this highlights a tension between the interests in (1) 
uniformity among commercial rules and (2) encouraging parties to reach 
their own solutions and thereby facilitate competitive variation among 
these rules. Funds transfer law could also be seen as providing compre-
hensive, consistent rules in lieu of varied and uncertain case law.46 
However, this is an ad hoc explanation that misses the critical role that 
fimds transfer law plays in financial marketplaces. Consumer protection 
is a third possible explanation for the ·importance of fimds transfer law 
and has been the focus of many of the drafters of the U.N. Model 
Law.47 Yet, focusing on consumer protection neglects the size and 
sophistication of the principal users of fimds transfer services-large 
financial institutions and corporations. These three alternative arguments, 
considered in sununacy fashion below, are insufficient explanations for 
the purpose of fimds transfer law. Still, the argument presented herein is 
considerate of them and they should not be seen as wholly deficient 
A. Backstop to Private Agreements 
The prefatory note to Article 4A intimates the backstop approach. In 
a section entitled ''Why is Article 4A needed?," the NCCUSL and ALI 
indicate that "[t]here is no comprehensive body of law that defines the 
rights and obligations that arise from wire transfers. . . . Article 4A is 
intended to provide the comprehensive body of law that we do not have 
today.'>48 Private agreements, including the fimds transfer system rules 
of Fedwire and CHIPS, provide some but not all of the necessary 
governing regime. A fimds transfer statute will supplement these 
agreements and govern the entire fimds transfer chain. 
•s See infra notes 48-66 and accompanying text. 
46 See infra notes 67-91 and accompanying text. 
47 See infra notes 92-111 and accompanying text. 
41 U.C.C. art. 4A Prefatoty Note, at ill (1990) [hereinafter Prefatoty Note]. 
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The NCCUSL/ALI explanation is not a rigorous answer to the 
question posed in the rubric "Why is Article 4A needed?" Comprehen-
siveness, though desirable because the statute will apply from origina-
tor49 to beneficiary,S0 is neither a .guiding principle for drafters nor an 
underlying explanation for scholars. To what end, then, should the critical 
provisions of the systematic statute be directed? The statute must be 
explored for a primary purpose.51 
The NCCUSLIALI explanation of the need for Article 4A is suspect 
for three reasons. First, even the numerous provisions of Article 4A that 
are variable by party agreemenf2 are likely to be more than backstops 
because the cost of contracting out of them may exceed the benefits. 53 
The parties might be unable to negotiate a reallocation of their initial 
legal entitlements because of prohibitively high bargaining costs. Under 
the Coase Theorem, the removal of impediments to bargaining is a 
necessary requirement for a mutually beneficial transaction.54 The Coase 
49 U.C.C. § 4A-104(c) (1990) defines "originator" as ''the sender of the first payment 
order in a funds transfer." 
50 A "beneficiary'' is ''the person to be paid by the beneficiary's bank." Id. § 4A-
103(a)(2). The ''beneficiary's bank," in turn, is ''the bank identified in a payment order 
in which an account of the beneficiary is to be credited pursuant to the order or which 
otherwise is to make payment to the beneficiary if the order does not provide for payment 
to an account." Id. § 4A-103(a)(3). 
51 Professor Scott grappled with this problem in the context of check collection law, 
and he rightly refused to accept that law as nothing more than a codification of the law 
merchant: 
My thesis is that the need to backstop private contract or to provide 
"rational" ordering is not a s'ffficient explanation for statutory development. 
Statutoty commercial law rules are instead to be understood as largely 
regulatory in import. Some rules deal with cases where private contract actually 
fails to structure risk allocation or fails to structure it efficiently. Other rules are 
enacted to rid merchants and financial institutions of common law restraints on 
contract or to eliminate the competition accompanying contractual freedom. Still 
others may be enacted at the insistence of consmners to limit the contractual 
freedom of merchants. In any case, statutoty rules are principally designed to 
alter rather than to "codify'' the existing legal regime. They reflect concern with 
the ability of various transactors, whether merchants or consumers, to protect 
themselves in the marketplace, and they are ultimately distributional in 
character. 
Scott, supra note 7, at 738-39 (emphasis added). 
sz U.C.C. § 4A-501(a) (1990) (providing a general authorization for variation by 
agreement). 
~ Scott, supra note 7, at 741; see infra notes 184-209 and accompanying text. 
54 The critical assumptions of the Coase Theorem are that the parties have 
substantial, relevant infonnation and act rationally, and that there are no transaction costs. 
The Coase Theorem states that allocative efficiency (the· maximum productive use of 
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Theorem is applicable in that because of these impediments, a financial 
transaction may not occur. Funds transfers are potentially cheaper means 
of settling payment obligations than paper-based systems and, according-
ly, the Coase Theorem would suggest that, other factors being equal, 
mutually beneficial financial transactions will occur where funds transfers 
are used. At the same time, insofar as parties rely on the backstop rules, 
they cease to fashion their own creative solutions. Thus, the rules 
preclude competitive variation in risk allocation.55 
Second, there is a tension between supplementing private agreements 
and achieving uniformity. A funds transfer statute that serves as a 
backstop to private funds transfer system agreements must contain 
optional provisions or else the statute will intervene in too many issues 
rather than simply supplement the agreements. 56 Optional provisions, 
however, are at odds with the goal of achieving uniformity. Moreover, 
they impede the achievement of economies of scale57 in risk allocation 
rules. 
resources) depends not on the initial assignment oflegal rights, which is only the starting 
point from which negotiations begin, but rather on market values of resources. The parties 
will negotiate and trade their legal entitlements based on the marginal benefit and 
marginal cost of their respective resources. There is "bargaining room" whenever the 
marginal benefit exceeds the marginal cost Hence, party A (a farmer) who is initially 
assigned a legal right (to prohibit cattle raising on adjacent property) will trade it away 
to party B (a rancher next door) iftte value of party B'sresource (the marginal benefit 
from raising a cow) exceeds the value of party A's resource (the marginal cost of crop 
damaged by the cow). Where negotiations cease, resources are allocated efficiently. Jules 
Coleman, Efficiency, Exchange, and Auction: Philosophic Aspects of the Economic 
Approach to Law, 68 CAL. L. REv. 221, 223-25, 236 (1980). 
Whether the Coase Theorem applies to complex cases and large bargaining groups 
is an open issue. See generally ElizBbeth Hoffinan & Matthew Spitzer, Experimental Tests 
of the Coase Theorem with Large Bargaining Groups, 15 J. LEGAL SlUD. 149 (1986) 
(describing the limited applicability of the Coase Theorem to bargaining situations 
involving many parties). 
" Scott, supra note 7, at 776, 792. 
56 ld. at 776. 
57 Traditionally, "economies of scale" means that the cost per unit, or average cost, 
of production declines as the total amount of output increases. Eric Rasmussen & Todd 
7£nser, Diseconomies of Scale in Employment Contracts, 6 J.L., EcoN. & ORG. 65, 65 
(1990). If financial market players governed by a funds transfer statute exercise their right 
to opt out of certain provisions, then they must negotiate altemative rules and, therefore, 
incur transaction costs. The cost per funds transfer rises because of such transactions 
costs; thus, the long-run average cost cmve does not decrease as dramatically or become 
as flat as would be the case if the parties did not opt out of the statute. This implies that 
it takes a larger number of funds transfers to achieve an economy of scale. 
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Third, Professor Scott's skepticism toward arguments supporting 
uniform law is equally applicable to arguments in favor of a comprehen-
sive funds transfer statute: "One must be wary, however, of the argument 
for uniform law. Often it is nothing more than a political ploy to protect 
a statutory outcome."58 Banks sought to reallocate judicially-allocated 
risks in drafting both the American Bankers' Association Bank Collection 
Code of 192~9 and Article 4A.60 Much of the commentary from 
commercial banks during the Article 4A drafting process concerned 
limiting the liability of these banks. This typifies their interest in 
reallocating risks to originators and beneficiaries. 61 
The backstop explanation is essentially a microeconomic argument. 
Under this law and economics approach, a legitimate question is why 
transactors in the funds transfer marketplace cannot be relied upon to 
devise a set of efficient governing rules. Indeed, if indicia of efficiency 
such as high speed, low cost, and certainty are important to the players 
in the inverted pyramid, 62 then absent a showing of market failure, 
51 Scott, supra note 7, at 775. 
59 Id. at 761-62. 
60 The final draft of Article 4A was approved by the NCCUSL and ALI in June 
1989, and drafting began at least as early as 1987. U.C.C. § 4A-102 cmt. (1990) 
(presenting a general drafting history of Article 4A). 
61 See, e.g., Letter from Thomas E. Montgomery, Vice President and Assistant 
General Counsel, Bank of America, to William B. Davenport. Counsel, First National 
Bank of Chicago (Sept. 2, 1987) (on file with author) (suggesting that the exception to 
the limitation on damages recoverable against a receiving bank for ''malicious disregard 
of the rights of the injured party'' is too vague); Letter and Accompanying Major Issues 
List from Richard M. Gottlieb, Vice President and Associate General Counsel, 
Manufacturers Hanover Trust Company, to Robert Ballen, Esq., Morrison & Forester 
(Sept. 1, 1987) (on file with author) (advocating, for instance, (1) that the entire loss from 
an unauthorized transfer shift to the customer unless the customer notifies the receiving 
bank of the loss within fifteen days because the burden on the receiver to prove that the 
customer's delay resulted in the loss is otherwise too difficult and (2) that consequential 
damage liability be limited to instances where a bank acted in "bad faith" or ''malicious 
disregard"); Letter from John C. Watten, Vice President and Counsel, Wachovia 
Cotporation, to Roland E. Brandel, Chainnan, American Bar Association Ad Hoc 
Committee on Payment Systems (Aug. 7, 1987) (on file with author) (criticizing the use 
of a comparative fault standard in cases of unauthorized transfer orders and advocating 
(1) that a customer who fails to meet notifications requirements should be liable for loss 
and (2) the right of a destination bank to charge back a beneficiacy's account in a failed 
bank case regardless of whether such revocation is authorized in an agreement with the 
beneficiacy). 
<~Z See infra notes 112-209 and accompanying text. 
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intervention from an external official body such as NCCUSL, the ALI, 
or the Federal Reserve is unlikely to lead to efficient outcomes.63 
There are at least two microeconomic responses to the backstop 
explanation. The first concerns the transaction costs of collective action: 
"[B]argaining is not costless.'>M Although a number of commercial 
banks that provide funds transfer services (as well as the Federal Reserve 
and some corporations that use funds transfer services) participated in the 
drafting of U.C.C. Article 4A,65 many financial institutions that were 
affected by the new statute, such as securities firms, were not involved 
Moreover, the U.N. Model Law was drafted by official delegates 
representing countries, not commercial parties. In reality, because of 
economic and political barriers, not every interested party is willing or 
able to represent itself at negotiation and drafting sessions. 
Second, there is a matter of forecasting who the interested parties are 
likely to be. The thesis that funds transfer law should serve the interests 
ofthe financial marketplace is dynamic because that marketplace changes 
at a dizzying rate. Not every financial instrumf1nt that is currently traded 
is settled by funds transfer, but undoubtedly those involved in the trading 
of such instruments may in the future seek to use funds transfers as a 
means of settlement. 66 The difficulty is in identifying a priori which 
parties in which markets will most likely want to consider funds transfer 
settlements. The problem is compounded by the fact that potentially 
affected parties are unlikely to identify themselves at the time when the 
bard work of negotiating and drafting a law must be done. Such parties 
may have given the matter little thought as yet or may simply be 
preoccupied with short-term trading matters. There is, in sum, imperfect 
information about potential future repercussions of funds transfer law. It 
falls upon the shoulders of the drafters to anticipate financial innovations 
and to ensure that their product accommodates these innovations. A law 
and economics approach might suggest that the task of drafting be left to 
the market, specifically, to the financial players that currently rely on 
funds transfers. However, the task of anticipating developments regarding 
future applications of funds transfer settlement is aided by the interven-
tion of additional parties that sit in a "bird's eye" position. The Federal 
61 For an overview of classical rationales for regulatory intervention, see STEPHEN 
BREYER, REGuLATION AND ITS REFORM 15-35 (1982); RICHARD PoSNER, EcoNOMIC 
ANALYSIS OF LAW 367-70 (1992). 
64 BREYER, supra note 63, at 24. 
65 See supra note 60. 
66 See, e.g., infra note 146 (discussing the same-day funds settlement proposal of the 
National Securities Clearing Cmporation and the Depositozy Trust Company). 
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Reserve, legal scholars, and others can at least ensure that :funds transfer 
law is not drafted with only narrow, short-term interests in mind. 
B. Responding to the Common Law 
The prefatory note to Article 4A of the U.C.C. also suggests a second 
explanation of the need for Article 4A: Article 4A is needed to respond 
to uneven or unwelcome common law developments. Courts are uncertain 
as to whether analogies to other payments mechanisms such as negotiable 
instruments are appropriate in detennining the outcome of a :funds 
transfer case. ''The result is a great deal of uncertainty. There is no 
consensus about the judicial nature of a wire transfer and consequently 
of the rights and obligations that are created.':o67 
Although the pre-Article 4A common law of electronic :funds 
transfers highlighted issues for resolution by statute, 68 the reliance of the 
NCCUSL/ALI on the existence of these common law problems as an 
explanation of the need for Article 4A is inductive and haphazard. The 
broad import of Article 4A should not be inferred from narrow problems 
posed by a few, pre-Article 4A cases. Such an inference forecloses the 
opportunity to interpret the statutory response from the viewpoint of the 
key interest groups in the inverted pyramid: the trader, her settlements 
department, and the :funds transfer system used by that department. 
The draftpersons of Article 4A took issue with leading cases such as 
Evra Corporation v. Swiss Bank Corporation/9 in which the Seventh 
Circuit held that consequential damages could be awarded if a bank with 
notice of particular circumstances giving rise to damages refuses to 
execute a payment order. 70 They manifest their disagreement with the 
Evra result in the statutory provisions that bar consequential damages 
unless a receiving bank expressly agrees in writing to assume such 
Iii Prefatory Note, supra note 48, at iii. 
61 See supra text accompanying note 67; ilifra text accompanying notes 69, 73-74. 
s 673 F.2d 951 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1017 (1982) (ovenuled by U.C.C. 
§ 4A-305 (1990)). In Evra, the intermediaty bank, see ilifra note 104, failed to execute 
a payment order in the amount of $27,000. The intended beneficiary of the order 
cancelled the originator's ship charter and the originator was forced to obtain a new ship 
charter at a far higher cost. Id. at 952-53. Applying the common law test in Hadley v. 
Baxendale, 9 Ex. 341, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854), that consequential damages are not 
available unless the defendant is notified of special circumstances that might give rise to 
them, the comt found that the originator could not recover $2.1 million in lost profits 
from the intermediaty bank. Evra Corp., 673 F.2d at 955-56. 
10 U.C.C. § 4A-305 cmt. 2 (1990). 
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liability. 71 The case posed two dangers. First, other jurisdictions would 
reach the same or substantially similar results, leading to the imposition 
of "crushing'' liability on banks, which, in turn, would harm the funds 
transfer service industry.72 Alternatively, other jurisdictions would reach 
different results, leading to a patchwork of rules about liability that would 
be unworkable for any interstate or international funds transfer. Clearly, 
however, there is no need for an entirely new U.C.C. article just to handle 
a limitation of damages problem. 
The case of Delbroeck & Co. v. Manufocturers Hanover Trost Co. 73 
posed a different challenge for the draftspersons, but it also fails to shed 
light. on the underlying purpose of the statute. The case grew out of the 
celebrated failure of a German bank, Bankhaus I.D. Herstatt, K.G.a.A 
(''Herstatt''), which had entered into three foreign exchange contracts with 
Delbrueck & Company ("Delbrueck"). At issue was whether an originator 
(Delbrueck) of $12.5 million worth of future value CHIPS payments 
messages could revoke the messages after learning that German banking 
regulators had closed the intended beneficiary .(Herstatt) of the funds 
transfers.74 The related rules on the revocation and amendment of 
71 /d. § 4A-305 & cmt 2. Consequential damages are available in one instance under 
Article 4A: a beneficiazy's bank accepts a payment order on behalf of a beneficiazy, 
xefuses to pay the beneficiazy, and has no xeasonable doubt about the right of the 
beneficiazy to the funds. /d. § 4A-404(a) & cmt. 2. 
A "receiving bank" is a bank to which the instruction of a sender is addressed, the 
sender being the person giving the instruction. U.C.C. § 4A-103(a)(4)-(5) (1990). 
12 Of course, unless precluded by statute, banks are free to limit their liability for 
consequential damages. Problems of characterizing "consequential damages" in the funds 
transfer context do not seem severe. Banks could, for example, disclaim liability for 
damages other than the principal amount of the transfer, interest for the applicable period, 
and the cost of the transfer. 
73 609 F.2d 1047 (2d Cir. 1979). 
74 /d. at 1049-50. A future value payment order is one whose execution date is after 
the date of xeceipt by the xeceiving bank. Delbnleck issued two payment orders (or, in 
CmPS parlance, "payments. messages'') to the originator's bank, Manufacturers Hanover 
Trust Company ("MHT'): (1) on June 25, 1974, calling for a $12.5 million transfer on 
June 26 to the Chase Manhattan Bank ("Chase"), the beneficiazy's bank, for Herstatt's 
account; and (2) on June 26, 1974, calling for a $10 million transfer on June 27 to Chase 
for Herstatt's account. Herstatt was closed on June 26 at 10:30 a.m. eastern standard time. 
The opinion indicates that Delbnleck's second payment message was sent "early on the 
moming of June 26" but does not make clear whether this was before or after 10:30 a.m. 
Jd. at 1050. In any event, on June 26 Delbnleck issued xevocation orders to MHTat 11:30 
a.m., 12:00 noon, and later in the aftemoon. While the $10 million funds transfer due on 
June 27 was stopped, the $12.5 million transfer due on June 26 was completed. On June 
26, MHT executed the $12.5 million payment message at 11:36 a.m. (by issuing a 
message ,to Chase for $10 million) and 11:37 a.m. (by issuing a message to Chase for 
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payment orders and receiver finality set forth in Article 4A are important 
features of the statute, but they are insuffic~ent evidence on which to base 
an inference as to the broader import of Article 4A75 Nonetheless, 
commentators have sought to predicate the purpose of Article 4A on the 
problems posed by the case.76 
Still another challenge posed by pre-Article 4A case law concerned 
the responsibility of a beneficiary's bank with respect to a payment order 
in which the name and account number of the beneficiary do not 
match. 77 Must the bank examine each payment order received for 
mismatches and, if so, what must it do with a payment order that contains 
inconsistencies?'8 
While this brief review of some leading pre-Article 4A cases suggests 
a stimulus-response relationship between pre-Article 4A common law and 
certain Article 4A rules, it must be remembered that a statute bas a life 
beyond the facts of particular cases that arguably spawned the statute. 
$2.5 million). Chase credited Herstatt's account at 9:00p.m. on June 26. Delbrueck argued 
that the $12.5 million transfer was revocable until 9:00 p.m. and that MHT had acted 
negligently by failing to act on the revocation orders. Looking to banking custom and 
practice regarding revocability of CHIPS transfers, a modification of the CHIPS finality 
rules made after the Herstatt failure, and the common law of assignment of cboses in 
action, the court held that the transfer was irrevocable. Id. at 1050-51. 
• 
75 U.C.C. § 4A-211 (1990) (amendment of payment orders); id. § 4A-405 (receiver 
finality). Interestingly, the facts of Delbrueck could not be repeated if the funds transfer 
had been conducted through Fedwire instead of CHIPS. See 12 C.F.R. § 210.30(c) (1992). 
Under the cmren.t version of Regulation J, a Federal Reserve Bank will not accept a 
payment order that calls for execution on a funds-transfer business day later than the day 
of receipt. Thus, if Delbrueck had had access to Fedwire and had issued the June 25 
payment order to a Reserve Bank. the order would have been rejected. Note, however, 
that an exception to the same-day execution rule may be made for future-value transfers 
from foreign central bank accounts maintained at the Federal Reserve Bank of New Yorlc. 
PATRIKIS, BAXTER & BHALA, supra note 6, at 72. 
76 See, e.g., Roger Cowie, Note, Cancellation of Wire Transfers Under Article 4A of 
the Uniform Commercial Code: Delbrueck & Co. v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co. 
Revisited, 70 TEx. L. REv. 739, 740 (1992). 
77 See generally Bradford Trust eo: v. Texas Am. Bank-Houston, 790 F.2d 407 (5th 
Cir. 1986) (holding a trust company liable for a forged wire transfer despite the fact that 
the transferee was negligent in failing to notice the discrepancy); Securities Fund Servs., 
Inc. v. American Nat'lBank & Trust Co., 542 F. Supp. 323 (N.D. Til. 1982) (holding that 
where a collecting bank failed to notice a discrepancy, the wire transfer contemplated a 
credit to the account rather than a safekeeping arrangement). 
71 The statutory solution to the problem is to allow the beneficimy's bank to rely 
solely on the account nmnber. U.C.C. § 4A-207 & cmt. 2 (1990). Interestingly, the 
illustrative hypothetical case in the official comment involves a wire transfer of proceeds 
from the redemption of mutual fund shares-in other words, a funds transfer generated by 
a financial market transaction. Id. 
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Many statutes would become obsolete very quickly if their raison d'etre 
was based on early case law. The vitality of Article 4A, and funds 
transfer law generally, is and will continue to be derived from the use of 
funds transfers to settle payment obligations arising from domestic and 
international financial transactions. Indeed, this proposition is suggested 
by cases in which the facts arose before the enactment of Article 4A but 
which were adjudicated thereafter.79 
The aforementioned cases should be seen from this financial market 
perspective. For instanCe, the Evra court's statement that "[e]lectronic 
funds transfers are not so unusual as to automatically place a bank on 
notice of extraordinary consequences if such a transfer goes awry''80 
should be re-evaluated in light of the fact that large-dollar financial deals 
are settled by funds transfer, and several such deals are often linked in 
purpose.81 Every receiving ba.nk_B2 should know that the payment order it 
receives, accepts, and executes is likely to represent settlement of a major 
transaction in foreign exchange, securities, or money market instruments. 
Conversely, imposing consequential damage liability on receiving banks 
could raise transaction costs associated with these deals. Receiving banks 
will factor the expected cost of consequential damage liability into their 
funds transfer service fees, thereby insuring against the risk that such 
liability will be imposed, but raising costs for senders. 
79 See, e.g., Banque Wonns v. BankAmerica Int'l. 570 N.E.2d 189 (N.Y. 1991) 
(involving a revolving credit agreement); see also In re Koreag, Controle et Revision 
S.A., 961 F.2d 341, 344-45 (2d Cir. 1992) (involving transactions in foreign currency and 
the application ofU.C.C. Article 2, though not discussing payment obligations from such 
transactions); Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co. v. Chemical Bank, 559 N.Y.S.2d 704 
{App. Div. 1990) (involving a mistaken transfer to a Merrill Lynch account), appeal 
denied, 569 N.E.2d 874 (N.Y. 1991). The ability to rely on opinions for this point is 
limited because they tend to spend little, if any, time on the underlying transactions. Data 
and reports published by central banks and the Bank for International Settlements, such 
as those cited StqJTa notes 17 and 19, il!fra notes 84, 98, 112, 114, 116, 146, and 164, are 
more helpful in this regard. . 
10 Evra Corp. v. Swiss Bank Corp., 673 F.2d 951, 956 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 
u.s. 1017 (1982). 
11 Consider a U.S. dollar-Singapore dollar spot foreign exchange contract where 
delivery of two million Singapore dollars against one million U.S. dollars is delayed. The 
purchaser of the Singapore dollars is an equity broker from the Far East who is buying 
shares on behalf of the broker's client, a U.S. mutual fimd, in an initial public offering on 
the Singapore Stock Exchange. Because of the delayed credit of Singapore dollars to the 
broker's account, the purchase of the stock may also be delayed. The broker is forced to 
buy the shares at a higher price later in the secondary market The broker must, therefore, 
either absorb the cost of the delayed execution or pass it on to the mutual fund. 
12 See StqJTa note 71. 
368 KENTuCKY LAW JOURNAL [Vol 82 
The Delbrueck decision suggests that funds transfer law can mitigate, 
but not wholly resolve, credit risk issues. Delbrueck chose to engage in 
foreign exchange deals with a counterparty that failed, and faced what 
became known as the ''Herstatt riSk'' problem, 83 ·which is one of 
delivering one currency to the trading counterparty but not receiving the 
amount of foreign exchange bargained for in return. 84 Statutory rules on 
revocation and amendment of payment orders85 and receiver finalityU help 
define the period of credit risk exposure: Delbrueck is at risk from the 
moment that its payment message becomes irrevocable until the moment 
that Herstatt's payment is final The rules, however, cannot substitute for 
credit risk analysis and the establishment of position limits for trading 
foreign exchange with certain counterparties. Moreover, Herstatt risk can 
be reduced by structuring settlement arrangements with a counterparty of 
dubious credit worthiness in a conservative fashion through use of an 
escrow account. F:T 
The U.C.C. Section 4A-207 rule that a beneficiary's bank has no duty 
to check for a name/number mismatch in a payment ordefS facilitates 
rapid, non-human processing. The high speed characteristic of a funds 
transfer makes it particularly desirable for foreign exchange, securities, 
and money market dealers who seek rapid settlement of payment 
obligations. 89 The statutory responses to Securities Fund Servic~ and 
13 The "Herstatt risk" problem is named after the failed bank with whom Delbmeck 
had foreign exchange contracts. See Delbmeck & Co. v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust 
Co., 609 F.2d 1047, 1049-50 (2d Cir. 1979). 
14 See BANK FOR INT'L SETILEMENTS {BASLE, SWITzERLAND), REPoRT OF THE 
COMMI'ITEE ON INTERBANK NEITING SCHEMES OF THE CENTRAL BANKS OF THE GROUP 
OF TEN COUNTRIES ~ 2.16 {Nov. 1990) [hereinafter LAMPALUSSY REPORT, after the 
Chainnan of the Committee on Interbank Netting Schemes, M. A Lamfalussy]. 
15 U.C.C. § 4A-211 (1990); U.N. MODEL LAW art. 12 (1992). 
16 U.C.C. § 4A-405(c). 
17 The aim is to prevent one party from simultaneously having both the foreign 
exchange and the U.S. dollars to pay for the foreign exchange. Accordingly, the U.S. 
dollars can be transferred to an escrow account and released when the foreign cummcy 
is delivered to the escrow agent. 
n U.C.C. § 4A-207 {1990); U.N. MODEL LAW art. 10(4) (a comparable provision, 
stating that when a beneficiary bank detects a discrepancy, it must give notice to the 
sender, if identifiable). 
89 See, e.g., RICHARD B. MILLER, cmcoRP: THE STORY OF A BANK IN CRisis 129 
(1993) (''With the awesome power and speed of electronic transfers, the scope of foreign-
exchange trading is constantly increasing.''). 
90 Securities Fund Servs., Inc. v. American Nat'lBank& Trust Co., 542 F. Supp. 323 
(N.D. lll. 1982). 
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Bradford TIUSt 91 altered the common law landscape in a .way that protects 
this characteristic. 
C. Consumer Protection 
Consumer protection is .a third candidate to compete with the 
argument that the primary standard for evaluating fimds transfer law is 
the extent to which it meets the needs of financial market players. As 
indicated by the impractical provision on assistance92 and the controver-
sial provision on deemed acceptance/3 a number of the delegates of the 
United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (''UNCITRAL") 
sought to draft a U.N. Model Law that would be oriented to the needs 
and protection of consumers. A concern for consumer protection might 
also explain the potentially draconian liabilities facing a receiving bank 
that fails to execute or improperly executes a payment order. 94 However, 
consumer protection is not the basic thrust of the U.N. Model Law, which 
91 Bradford Trust Co. v. Texas Am. Bank-Houston, 790 F.2d 407 (5th Cir. 1986). 
92 Under UN. MODEL LAw art. 13, "each receiving bank is requested to assist the 
originator and each subsequent sending bank, and to seek the assistance of the next 
receiving bank'' to ensure that the credit transfer is complete. It may be good business 
practice for a receiving bank to provide such assistance, but there should be no hint of 
an obligation for the bank to investigate mishaps up and down a funds transfer chain, as 
this will add to delays and costs in processing payment orders. Further, because there is 
no remedy for failure to provide such assistance, a comt may potentially fashion a remedy 
on the ground that the provision is otherwise meaningless; and these resulting judicial 
remedies may be non-unifOllll. Cf. U.C.C. § 1-203 (imposing obligation of good faith); 
id. § 4A-105(a)(6) (defining good faith). 
93 Under UN. MODEL LAw art. 7(2)(e), a receiving bank other than the beneficimy's 
bank is deemed to have accepted a payment order when the time for giving notice of 
rejection has expired. UN. MODEL LAw art. 9(1)(h) states the same rule for a 
beneficimy's bank. The U.C.C. Article 4A approach is to place a five-day time limit on 
the life of a payment order, U.C.C. § 4A-210{b), and limit a receiving bank's liability for 
failure to give notice of rejection to interest for this period. Id. § 4A-211(d). Passive 
acceptance without liability limits fails to account for the fact that in the high-vollDII.e 
world of payment order processing, a receiving bank may be sent thousands of payment 
orders in a few hours. While banks with sophisticated systems should be able to 
accommodate this vollDII.e, new entrants to the funds transfer service business may be 
slower in rejecting orders. (For example, banks in certain countries take days to provide 
notices of rejection.) Imposing a larger penalty may force new entrants to bring high-
speed payment order processing systems on line quickly; on the other hand, it may 
discourage them from providing funds transfer services at all. 
114 UN. MODEL LAW art. 18 suggests that remedies, other than those identified in 
Article 17, may be available for intentional or reckless failure to execute a payment order 
properly if there is actual knowledge that loss would be likely to result. 
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states that "[t]his law does not deal with issues related to the protection 
of consumers."95 Nor is it the essence ofU.C.C. Article 4A, which clearly 
provides that consumer electronic payments are governed by a different 
legal regime.96 
The reason for the dear de-emphasis of consumer matters is plain. A 
payment obligation satisfied through a funds transfer can arise from 
virtually any sort of underlying contractual relationship between the 
buyer/payor and seller/payee.97 However, it is factually erroneous to think 
that consumer transactions generate the bulk of activity on Fedwire or 
CHIPS. "The bulk of payment activity is concentrated in New York City 
and is associated with securities trading, including transactions in 
commercial paper, and foreign exchange trading.'>98 This is not to say 
that there are no tensions whatsoever in the inverted pyramid but, rather, 
to point out that the principal players are large and sophisticated financial 
institutions. 
A subtle distinction between "consumers" and ''users" is implicit in 
the argument that there is more to funds transfer law than consumer 
protection. "Consumer'' conjures up images of individual or small 
business bank account holders and related consumer protection notions, 
yet they are far less likely to be originato~ or beneficiaries100 than large, 
sophisticated institutional investors.101 The term ''user'' better captures the 
players affected by funds transfer law. Consequently, provisions such as 
the money-back guarantee102 can be seen as basic user protections in a 
statute affecting the likes of Citibank ("Citi"), Morgan Guaranty Trust 
Company ("Morgan''), Banque Nationale de Paris (''BNP"), and Dai-lchi 
Kangyo (''DIK"). 
If consumer protection were the focus of funds transfer law, then that 
law would look vastly different from the U.N. Model Law or U.C.C. 
95 U.N. MODEL LAW art. 1. 
96 U.C.C. § 4A-108 (excluding consumer transactions that are governed by the 
Electronic Fund Transfer Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1693-1693r (1978), and its implementing 
regulation, Regulation E, 12 C.F.R. pt 205 (1993)). 
rn See supra note 26. 
91 CENTRAL BANKS OF THE GROUP OF TEN COUNTRIES AND SWTIZERLAND, BANK 
FOR INT'L SETILEMENTS (BASLE, SWTIZERLAND), PAYMENT 8YSTEMS IN ELEVEN 
DEVELOPED CoUNTRIES 215 (3d eel. 1989) [hereinafter PAYMENT SYSTEMS]. 
99 See supra note 49. 
100 See supra note 50. 
101 The cost of contracting out of statutory provisions is likely to be higher for such 
consumers than for sophisticated investors, thus making it more likely that those 
provisions will govern. 
101 U.C.C. § 4A-402(c); U.N. MODEL LAW art. 14(1). 
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Article 4A For example, provisions on disclosure obligations of receiving 
banks to senders, fee schedules of receiving banks, and severe limitations 
on the freedom of receiving banks to contract out of obligations might 
dominate the statute.103 Instead, neither the U.N. Model Law nor Article 
4A says anything about disclosure obligations-under those laws, a 
receiving bank need not inform a sender about how the sender's payment 
order will be processed, the route the funds transfer will take, the funds 
transfer system that will be used, or the risks of intermediary bank104 
failure. Fee schedules and cut-off hours are entirely unregulated, except 
by market forces. Most importantly, receiving banks are free to vary by 
agreement with their senders most of the statutory provisions.105 
Both the U.N. Model Law and Article 4A feature the freedom of 
parties to contract out of the statute in favor of their own arrange-
ments.106 The provision of this freedom suggests a conception of users 
103 See, for example, the Electronic Fund Transfer Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1693-1693r 
(1978), and Regulation E, 12 C.P.R. pt. 205 (1993), with respect to consumer electronic 
payments, and the Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1667e (1988), and Regulation 
Z, 12 C.P.R. § 226.25 (1993), with respect to credit cards. 
104 The ''intermeclimy bank'' is a receiving bank other than "the originator's bank or 
the beneficiacy's bank." U.C.C. § 4A-104(b). The "originator's bank'' is the bank to which 
the payment Oider of the originator (the sender of the first payment Oider in a funds 
transfer) is sent if the originator is an entity other than a bank. Id. § 4A-104(c)-(d). Where 
the originator is a bank, the originator and the originator's bank are the same party. Id. 
§ 4A-104(d)(ii). 
1
0$ In the UN. Model Law, the money-back guarantee cannot "be varied by agreement 
except when a prudent originator's bank would not have othetWise accepted a particular 
payment Oider because of a significant risk involved in the credit transfer." U.N. MODEL 
LAW art. 14(2). With the exception of one limitation regarding agreement to a 
commercially unreasonable security procedure, the interloper fraud rules are variable. Id. 
art. 5(3). A receiving bank cannot avoid its liability to a non-bank originator or 
beneficiaty. ld. art. 17(1). Similarly, in U.C.C. Article 4A, the only invariable provisions 
are the money-back guarantee, U.C.C. § 4A-402(f) (1990), the right of a beneficiaty to 
receive payment and damages in the event of wrongful nonpayment, id. § 4A-404(c), and 
the receiver finality rule. Id. § 4A-405(c). There are some limitations on the freedom to 
vary the interloper fraud rules, id. § 4A-202(f), and the discharge rule can be varied only 
by the agreement of the originator and beneficiaty, as the rule affects only those parties. 
/d. § 4A-406(d). 
106 UN. MODEL LAW art. 4 ("Except as otherwise provided in this law, the rights and 
obligations of parties to a credit transfer may be varied by their agreement."); U.C.C. § 
4A-501(a) (''Except as otherwise provided in this Article, the rights and obligations of a 
party to a funds transfer may be varied by agreement of the affected party."). Funds 
transfer system rules, as well as agreements between parties, are a second vehicle for 
altering the U.C.C. Article 4A regime. Participants in the system, namely, banks, are the 
beneficiaty of this freedom: ''Except as otherwise provided in this Article, a funds-transfer 
system rule governing rights and obligations between participating banks using the system 
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and providers of funds transfer services who operate on a level playing 
field rather than the classic unequal bargaining power scenario that a 
consumer protection statute anticipates.107 In the classic consumer 
protection scenario, the universe of consumers and vendors is virtually 
mutually exclusive.108 In the world of high finance and funds transfers, in 
contrast, sizeable, experienced financial institutions populate both the 
''user'' and ''provider'' categories. Citi, Morgan, BNP, and DIK are service 
users (ie., originators or beneficiaries) when they buy and sell financial 
instruments amongst themselves and settle their resulting payment 
obligations by funds transfers. In other instances, they provide funds 
transfer services (i.e., they act as the originator's bank/09 an intermedi-
ary -bank,110 or a beneficiary's bank111) and thus receive and execute 
payment orders for the users. 
N. THE INvERTED PYRAMID 
A. The Macroeconomic Purpose of Funds Transfer Law 
A funds transfer law should primarily serve the financial markets, 
specifically the interests of the players in those markets. The foreign 
exchange markets, short-term money markets, interbank lending markets, 
corporate securities markets, and derivative products markets are the 
laboratories for testing funds transfer law.112 The macroeconomic goals 
may be effective even if the rule conflicts with this Article and indirectly affects another 
party to the funds transfer who does not consent to the rule." Id. § 4A-501(b) (emphasis 
added). In fact, a funds transfer system rule can even govem banks that do not participate 
in the system. See id. § 4A-501(b). 
107 See generally JOHN M. CAR1WRIGHT, UNEQUAL BARGAINlNG {1991) (discussing 
bargaining positions during the contract fonnation process) . 
• 1111 Id. 
109 U.C.C. § 4A-104(d) (1990) (stating that the originator, if it is a bank, is also the 
originator's bank). 
110 See supra note 104. 
111 See supra note 50; infra note 168. 
uz Conspicuously absent from this list is the market for U.S. government securities. 
These book-entry securities, maintained in the accounts of depository institutions at a 
Federal Reserve Bank, are delivered from a seller to a buyer simultaneously with the 
payment from the buyer (delivery-versus-payment, or DVP). While the payment is made 
through Fedwire, the transfer is not governed by U.C.C. Article 4A. It is a debit transfer 
(wherein the securities seller initiates the payment instruction) and bears an electronic 
type code distinct from ''nonnal" Fedwire funds transfers. FED. REsERVE BANK OF N.Y., 
OPERATING CIRCULAR No. 8, FuNDs TRANSFERS THROUGH FEDWIRE ~ 5 {rev. effective 
Jlin. 1, 1991) [hereinafter OPERATING CIRCULAR No. 8]. See generally CEN1RAL BANKS 
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of :funds transfer law should be to support the growth and development 
of these domestic and international financial markets. Funds transfer law 
should facilitate (1) growth in the volume of financial transactions and in 
the size of each transaction and (2) the development of internationally 
competitive financial centers.113 
The underlying transaction that gives rise to a payment obligation 
settled by a :funds transfer is very likely to be a spot or forward foreign 
exchange contract,114 an investment in a short-term money market 
OF THE GROUP OF TEN COUNTRIES AND SWITzERLAND, BANK FOR lNT'L SE'I'ILEMENTS 
{BASLE, SWITzERLAND), DELIVERY VERSUS PAYMENT IN SECURITIES . SETILEMENT 
SYSTEMS (Sept. 1992) (discussing the types and sources of financial risk in the clearing 
and settlement of contracts for the purchase and sale of securities). 
113 Professor Spak's insightful argument that U.C.C. Article 4A is needed to provide 
legal certainty given the increasing frequency and volmne of wire transfer activity does 
not go far enough. He rightly suggests that this activity is generated by changes in federal 
banking law that "open up investment banking opportunities to the nation's commercial 
banks heretofore barred under the Glass-Steagall Act," Michael I. Spak, The Case to be 
Made for Proposed Article 4A of the Uniform Commercial Code: What's a Trillion 
Dollars between Friends?!, 80 KY. L.J. 167, 168 (1990-91), but fails to explore the 
specific financial activities that lead to wire transfers or to identify the interest groups 
involved in such activities. "The Glnss-Steagall Act is the popular name of the Banking 
Act of 1933, ch. 89, 48 Stat. 162 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 
U.S.C.)." /d. at 168 n.8. Professor Spak's reference to the Glass-Steagall Act is technically 
misleading. The Act limits the extent to which commercial banks can undenvrite and deal 
in non-bank eligible securities as principals (principally, cmporate debt and equity), yet 
such underwriting and dealing activities are only one of several potential types of 
financial transactions which give rise to funds transfers. Nothing in the Act restricts the 
ability of commercial banks to trade foreign exchange, short-term money market 
instruments, or to make and receive interbank loans, which, as discussed below, also 
generate payment obligations that are settled by funds transfers. 
114 In a foreign exchange transaction,. each party promises to deliver a specified 
amount of foreign exchange (not physical cummcy) to the other on an agreed date. 
Deliveries are accomplished by funds transfers. Thus, the foreign exchange markets are 
where bank credits denominated in different currencies are electronically delivered to 
bank accounts designated by the trading parties or their settlements departments. See 
generally ROGER M. KUBARYCH, FOREIGN ExCHANGE MARKErs IN THE UNITED STATES 
(Fed. Reserve Bank ofN.Y. 1983) (discussing foreign exchange transactions). Legally, 
these bank credits are chases in action. The ratio of the amount of one currency delivered 
against the receipt of the other currency is the exchange rate between the two currencies. 
The date on which the transaction is entered into is the ''trade date" (1). The date on 
which delivezy occurs is the "value date." For virtually all spot transactions, the value 
date is two business days after the trade date, or T+2 ("T+2 settlement''). For Canactian 
dollarJU.S. dollar deals, the trade date is T+1 (''tomnext," for ''tomorrow next," or "T+1 
settlement''). In contrast, a forward foreign exchange transaction is one where the value 
date is more than two business days after the trade date. See GRABBE, supra note 21, at 
393, 399; KUBARYCH, supra, at 9-10. 
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instrument, a purchase or sale of securities, or an interbank loan.115 
Typically, the tmnsactors are commercial and investment banks.116 These 
facts are critical to any proposed theory of funds transfer law. Specifical-
ly, with respect to foreign exchange transactions, payment obligations are 
settled by funds transfers through CHIPS.117 Payment obligations arising 
from purchases of some stocks, bonds, and government and government 
agency issues involve funds transfers through Fedwire.118 Efforts are 
underway to expand the use of funds transfers for settling corporate stock 
and bond transactions.119 Funds transfers through Fedwire are used to 
settle payment obligations arising from purchases and sales of Fed funds 
and repos120 and payment obligations associated with commercial pa-
per.121 Funds transfer law will better serve the players in the financial 
115 See generally KUBARYCH, supra note 114 (discussing foreign exchange 
transactions). 
116 Sophisticated individnal investors also transact in these markets. See, e.g., Salomon 
Forex, Inc. v. Tauber, 795 F. Supp. 768, 769-70 (B.D. Va. 1992) (portraying defendant 
Tauber as a wealthy veteran of the over-the-counter foreign exchange options markets). 
Of course, central banks intervene in the foreign exchange market to counter disorderly 
market conditions. FED. REsERVE BANK OF N.Y., FEDPOINTS 44: FOREIGN ExCHANGE 
INTERVENTION (Aug. 1988). See generally C. Edwani Fletcher, "Sophisticated Investors 
Under the Federal Securities Laws, 1988 DuKE L.J. 1081, app. 1149-55 (justifying 
disparate treatment of sophisticated and unsophisticated investors on the grounds of 
statutory interpretation and the position of sophisticated investors). 
117 GRABBE, supra note 21, at 75; KUBARYCH, supra note 114, at 36. Fedwire is 
involved in that net positions at the end of the funds-transfer business day of CHIPS me 
settled by Fedwire transfers to and from accounts of CHIPS settling participants. 
PATRIKIS, BAXTER & BHALA, supra note 6, at 203-04. 
111 BOARD OF GoVERNORS OF THE FED. REsERVE SYS., THE FEDERAL REsERVE 
SYsTEM: PuRPOSES AND FuNCTIONS 109 (1984) [hereinafter PuRPoSES AND FuNCTIONS]. 
119 See infra note 146 (discussing the same-day funds settlement proposal of the 
National Securities Clearing Corporation and the Depository Trust Company). It should 
be noted that payment for some cotporate and municipal securities is still made by means 
of a next-day funds settlement system. This involves the use of cashiers or clearing bank 
checks. See BOARD OF GoVERNORS OF THE FED. REsERVE SYs., STAFF STIJDY No. 163: 
CLEARANCE AND SETILEMENT IN U.S. SECURITIES MARKErs, app. D, at 28-29 (Mar. 
1992). 
120 PuRPOSES AND FuNCTIONS, supra note 118, at 109. Indeed, it has been suggested 
that the Fed funds and repo markets should be called ''the markets for short-tenn 
immediately available funds," Lucas et al., supra note 20, at 10, because both markets me 
settled in "immediately available funds" (a tenn referring to funds transfers thr9ugh 
Fedwire). Id. 
121 DAVID M. WEISs, AFTER THE TRADE Is MADE: PROCESSING SECURITIES 
TRANSACTIONS 214, 387 (1986); see also infra note 146 (discussing the same-day funds 
settlement proposal of the National Securities Clearing Corporation and the Depository 
Trust Company). 
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markets if certain benefits flow from the operation of the key features of the 
law. Players in the world of high finance will find that funds transfers are an 
attractive means of settling payment obligations if they are rapid, cheap, 
certain, secure, and entail minimal risks. Whether these benefits are 
realized-and thus whether more and bigger trades in specific financial 
markets can be accommodated-hinges critically on the rules established in a 
funds transfer statute. 
In addition to growth in the volume and amount of financial market 
transactions, an important macroeconomic goal is gaining or maintaining an 
international competitive advantage as a financial center. Every developed or 
emerging financial center can be conceived of in tenns of the inverted 
pyramid.122 Why are certain financial centers such as Singapore attractive, 
while other locations such as Bombay less so? What are the critical 
ingredients in the recipe for developing the Shanghai Stock Exchange and 
other such emerging markets?123 While there is more to obtaining an 
international competitive advantage as a financial marketplace than a 
supportive funds transfer law, 124 such a statute is needed to accommodate 
large-value credit transfers used to settle obligations arising from financial 
transactions.125 Policy makers and financiers who seek to develop their 
122 See supra notes 6-35 and accompanying text. 
123 See generally EcoNOMICS DEP'T, BANK NEGARA MALAYSIA {KUALA LUMPUR), 
MONEY AND BANKING IN MALAYSIA 339-66 (3d ed. 1989) (describing characteristics of 
the foreign exchange market in Malaysia); HU YEBI, CHINA's CAPITAL MARKlrr 69-74 
(1993) (discussing problems in the development of a stock market in China). 
124 There are other factors outside of the pyramid, some of which are immutable. 
Geographic location and the xelati.ve position in a time zone make London attrac-
tive-trading hours in London overlap with both the New York and Tokyo markets. Within 
the pyramid, slow and umeliable clearing and settlement mechanisms at the second level 
inhibit the transfer of ownership claims among investors. For instance, the collapse of the 
Taurus project for settling trades in uncertificated securities on the London Stock 
Exchange (''LSE'') has damaged the international prestige of the LSE. See After Taurus: 
City Lessons, FIN. TIMEs (London), Mar. 23, 1993, at 17; Taurus Done to Death, FIN. 
TIMEs (London), Mar. 12, 1993, at 13. Inadequate custody arrangements have hexetofoxe 
pxecluded U.S. investment companies from directly investing in the Shanghai and 
Shenzhen stock exchanges. 
125 See PAYMENT SYSTEMS IN DEVELOPED EcoNOMIES (Bruce Summers & Hans 
Blommestein eds., forthcoming 1993) (on file with author). It is beyond the scope of this 
Article to analyze the funds transfer laws of other countries in ~elation to the settlement 
of financial transactions in those countries. For an excellent guide to the European large-
value electronic Ciedit transfer systems used to settle payment obligations arising from 
financial transactions denominated in European currencies ·and the European Cu1I'ency 
Unit ("ECU") (e.g., the U.K.'sClearing House Automated Payments System, or CHAPS, 
for sterling Ciedit transfers and France's SAGIITAIRE system for settling international 
Fxench franc transfers), see CoMMITIEE OF GoVERNORS OF THE CENT. BANKS OF THE 
376 KmmJCKY LAW JOURNAL [Vol 82 
financial centers or preserve the global importance of those centers must pay 
due regard to the speed, cost, security ot: and risks associated with funds 
transfers. They must appreciate that the legal regime governing funds transfers 
detennines, in part, these features. 
The macroeconomic goals are most likely to be met where the critical 
provisions of the law meet the interests of the players in the financial 
markets. The typical approach to funds transfer services is to identify two 
categories of interested parties: users and providers.126 However, this 
obfuscates the relationship between settling payment obligations arising 
from financial market transactions and funds transfer law. Moreover, it 
fails to account for the overall consistency of interests of the players in 
the inverted pyramid with respect to funds transfer law. The four-level 
inverted pyramid127 should be the analytic framework in which to 
identify the relational positions of the players and their interests. 
Traders4he top level of the inverted pyramid-require a statute that 
fosters high speed transfers in order to minimize risk exposure and 
maximize their ability to use funds credited to their accounts. Traders also 
need a low-cost means of settling payment obligations that arise from 
their actions in the markets for foreign exchange, short-term money 
market instruments, interbank lending, and securities. Otherwise, the thin 
profit margins that sometimes characterize trading in these markets will 
erode.128 
MEMBER STATES OF THE EuROPEAN EcoNOMIC COMMUNITY, PAYMENT SYSTEMS IN EC 
MEMBER STATES {Sept. 1992) [hereinafter PAYMENT SYSTEMS IN EC MEMBER STATES]. 
126 See, for example, U.C.C. § 4A-102 cmt 2 (1990), which notes that 
[f]unds transfers involve competing interests-those of the banks that provide 
funds transfer services 8nd the commercial and financial organiVltions that use 
the services, as well as the public interest. These competing interests were 
represented in the drafting process and they were thoroughly considered. The 
rules that emetged represent a careful and delicate balancing of those interests 
(emphasis added). Similarly, the UN. Model law was negotiated among UNCITRAL 
delegates from all over the world representing central banks, ministries of finance and 
justice, and regional and international organizations. U.N. GAOR, 47th Sess., Supp. No. 
17, at 2-4, U.N. Doc. A/47/17 (1992). A common approach in negotiating and drafting 
the U.N. Model law was_to divide delegations along"''pro-consumer" and ''pro-bank'' 
lines. Id. 
127 See infra notes 139-211 and accompanying text. 
121 Consider a short sale of one million Singapore dollars in the Singapore dollar/U.S. 
dollar spot foreign exchange market, followed by a purchase of one million Singapore 
dollars to cover the short sale. Assmne that there are no brokerage or other transaction 
costs, that the short sale price is 1.640 Singapore dollars per U.S. dollar, and that the 
cover purchase price is 1.641 Singapore dollars per U.S. dollar. The profit on the 
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Settlements departments, the second level, attempt to minimize 
mcertainty arising in two contexts. First, the legal effect of using funds 
transfers as a means of settling payment obligations must be clear. 
Second, payment order processing and dealing with mishaps must be 
routine. 
Fmds transfer systems, the third level, aim to preserve contractual 
freedom for their system rules and implement risk-reduction schemes. 
Innovation ofthis sort reduces potential losses arising from the settlement 
failure of one or more system participants. In turn, reduced risk provides 
a competitive advantage for one system over another. 
Fmds transfer law, the focus of the third proposition, is the base of 
the inverted pyramid and must be. measured against the interests of the 
players who populate the top three levels of the pyramid. Technical rules 
on same-day execution, 129 consequential damage liability, 130 receiver 
finality, 131 discharge, 132 payment order processing, 133 money-back 
guarantee, 134 and variation by agreement135 should directly address 
these interests.136 
The link between macroeconomic goals for financial markets and the 
interests of financial market players should be clear: it is far easier to 
meet the goals if funds transfer law pays attention to the interests of 
financial market players. The logic behind this link is a modification of 
the classic doctrine of Adam Smith ''that if all seek to promote their self-
interest, the whole society prospers: 'He . . . neither intends to promote 
the publick [sic] interest, nor knows how much he is promoting it ... he 
intends only his own gain, and he is in this, as in many other cases, led 
by an invisible hand to promote an end which was no part of his 
. intention. "'137 If funds transfer law allows the players to enter into and 
transaction is the difference between the short sale price (U.S. $609,756.10) and the cover 
purchase price (U.S. $609,384.52), or just $371.58. 
m U.C.C. § 4A-301; U.N. MODEL LAw art. 11(1). 
130 U.C.C. § 4A-305(c); U.N. MODEL LAW art. 18. 
131 U.C.C. § 4A-405(c). There is no receiver finality rule in the UN. Model Law. 
m U.C.C. § 4A-406; U.N. MoDEL LAW art. 19 •. 
133 U.C.C. §§ 4A-207, 4A-208; UN. MODEL LAW arts. 8, 10. 
134 U.C.C. § 4A-402(c); U.N. MODEL LAW art. 14. 
135 U.C.C. § 4A-501; U.N. MODEL LAW art. 4. 
136 It is beyond the scope of this Article to evaluate the extent to which each of these 
rules satisfies the interests of the relevant financial market players. This critical analysis 
is performed in a companion article. See Bhala, supra note 8. 
137 TODD G. BUCHHOlZ, NEW IDEAS FROM DEAD EcoNOMISTS: AN INTRODUCTION 
TO MODERN EcoNOMIC THOUGHT 21-22 (1990) (quoting ADAM SMITH, 1 AN INQUIRY 
INTO THE NATIJRE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 456 (R.H. Campbell et al. 
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complete financial market deals more quickly, at lower cost, with greater 
certainty, and with less risk, then the players' interests are met In tum, 
the players will be able to engage in a greater number of transactions in 
a shorter period of time, and the average transaction will be larger. As a 
result, the financial markets will grow and prosper and funds transfer law 
will act-at best-as a visible hand promoting this end or-at worst-will 
not stand in the way of increased financial market activity. Thus, the first 
step to understanding the importance of funds transfer law must begin 
with an analysis of each interest group. 
B. Moving within the Inverted Pyramid 
Movement from the top through the third level deliberately corre-
sponds with the chronology of events in a financial market transac-
tion.138 First, the traders agree to a deal, which generates a payment 
obligation. If foreign exchange is traded, then each party is obligated to 
render timely delivery of currency to the other. If the deal is the purchase 
of a short-term money market instrument or a security, then the payment 
obligation is the timely delivery of the required consideration. If the deal 
is an interbank loan, then the payment obligations are effectively the 
disbursement of the loan and its subsequent repayment 
Second, the transaction is cleared and arrangements are made for the 
settlement of the payment obligations associated with the trade. These 
operations comprise level two of the inverted pyramid. Interestingly, the 
players at the top and second level are employed by the same financial 
institution (a commercial or investment bank), and that institution is a 
participant in one or more funds transfer systems. 
Through a funds transfer, payment obligations are settled. The funds 
transfer is ·conducted via a particular funds transfer system such as 
Fedwire or CHIPS. This is the third level of the inverted pyramid. 
Although the players and systems do not necessarily have the same 
interests regarding a funds transfer law, their interests tend to be broadly 
consistent Funds transfer law should thus support all three levels above 
it in the inverted pyramid. · 
eds., 1976)). 
131 See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, CLEARANCE AND SETILEMENT REFORM: THE 
STOCK, OPTIONS, AND FuroREs MARKETs ARE STH.L AT RisK 10-14 (Apr. 1990) (Pub. 
GAO/GGD-90-33) [hereinafter 1990 GAO REPORT]. 
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1. The Traders' Interests: High Speed and Low Cost 
The players at the top level are the traders employed by commercial 
banks, securities firms, and other financial institutions.139 Theirs is a 
twenty-four-hour world of telephones, computer tennina.Js, and portable 
electronic quotation devices for which a funds transfer law that ensures 
high speed transfers at low cost is needed. Traders buy and sell foreign 
exchange, stocks, bonds, commercial paper, bankers' acceptances, and Fed 
funds, engage in repos and reverse repos, and place and receive certifi-
cates of deposit and Eurodollar deposits. 
These financial market deals give rise to a payment obligation of the 
buyer to the seller, which is settled through a funds transfer.140 There-
u9 The tenn "traders" is used to focus attention on principals trading for the account 
of their institutions. Brokers are involved (e.g., in obtaining a countetparty for a seller of 
Malaysian ringgit or a countetparty for a buyer of stock in a Thai company), but they add 
a layer of factual complexity (and transaction costs) that does not alter the significance 
of funds transfer law. For a general introduction to the role of the trader, see DAVID M. 
WEISs, TRADERS: THE JOBS, THE PR.onucrs, THE MARKETs (1990). 
140 &e supra notes 6-35 and accompanying text. There are two caveats to this 
discussion. First, not every payment obligation in every financial instnunent is settled by 
a funds transfer. To take an extreme case, an investor buying stock on the Bombay Stock 
Exchange does not pay for its shares with a funds transfer. However, funds transfer law 
must anticipate the potential interest among financial transactors to settle their payment 
obligations over the wires. The recent same-day funds settlement proposal of the National 
Securities Clearing Corporation (''NSCC") and the Depository Trust Company ("DTC'), 
infra note 146 and accompanying text, is a case in point. A less extreme example is 
trading in· derivative instruments. Typically, futures contracts are settled by offsetting 
transactions. ROBERT E. FINK & ROBERT B. FEDUNIAK, Fu'ruREs TRADING: CONCEPTS 
AND STRATEGIES 48 (1988). 
Second, not every payment obligation arising from a securities purchase and settled 
electronically is a funds transfer. Purchases of U.S. government securities are paid for 
through electronic means, but the payments are not governed by funds transfer law. 
Transactions in these securities are conducted through the Federal Reserve's book-entry 
system on a delivery-versus-payment (''DVP") basis. Payment for a pmchased Treasmy 
security is made by debit entry to an account maintained at a Federal Reserve Bank and, 
simultaneously, the purchaser's securities account is credited for the amount of the 
securities. The payment side of these book-entry securities transactions is not governed 
by U.C.C. Article 4A or Regulation J, in part because the payment instructions are not 
"payment orders" under the relevant operating circular. &e OPERATING CIRCULAR No. 
8, supra note 112, at ~ 5 (listing the type codes for messages that are "payment orders''). 
Conceptually, the payments side of a DVP transaction is a debit transfer insofar as the 
securities seller (the payee) is instructing payment. Debit transfers are not governed by 
U.C.C. Article 4A. &e Prefatoty Note, supra note 48, at ii; U.C.C. § 4A-103(a)(l) 
(defining "payment order" to exclude debit transfers). 
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fore, a funds transfer typically bears an integral relationship not to a 
small-dollar retail or consumer transaction in goods--these are usually 
paid for with cash, check, credit or debit card-but rather to a large-dollar 
financial market deal.141 Payment obligations arising from foreign 
exchange transactions are customarily settled by funds transfer.142 
Similarly, trading in money market instruments, including certificates of 
deposit, bankers' acceptances, and some municipal government securities 
involves funds transfers. This is because "[b ]roker-dealers instruct their 
respective clearing banks to deliver the appropriate securities physically 
and make payment, usually through Fedwire."143 Purchases and sales of 
corporate securities-stocks and bonds-are cleared and settled through a 
clearing organization, such as the National Securities Clearing Corpora-
tion, and an associated depository that retains physical custody of the 
securities, such as the Depository Trust Company.144 Payments for 
many of these securities are made in next-day clearing house funds.145 
However, payments for some corporate securities, such as commercial 
paper, are made by funds transfer and efforts are already underway to 
expand the types of securities for which payment is made by funds 
transfer.146 
141 Prefatory Note, supra note 48, at i ("Payments that are covered by Article 4A are 
ovetWhelmingly between business or financial institutions."). 
142 See GRABBE, supra" note 21, at 75-76. Buyers and sellers of foreign currency 
maintain accounts with each other or with correspondent banks for purposes of receiving 
and delivering foreign exchange. /d. To be a player in the foreign exchange maiket, 
maintaining an account in every currency in which trading is conducted is necessary. 
143 PAYMENT SYSTEMS, supra note 98, at 225. -
144 /d. at 226; see supra notes 6-35 and accompanying text. 
145 PAYMENT SYSTEMS, supra note 98, at 226. 
146 For instance, the current DTC/NSCC system for settling transactions in common 
stocks, preferred stocks, corporate and municipal bonds, unit investment trusts, and 
warrants is a next-day funds settlement system. Memorandum from the Depository Trust 
Company and National Securities Clearing Corporation to Users and Interested Parties Re: 
Same-Day Funds Settlement System Conversion, at 5 (July 26, 1993) (on file with 
author). An NSCC member or DTC participant that owes money to NSCC or DTC as a 
result of a securities transaction pays by certified check. IfNSCC or DTC owes money, 
payment is made by draft. The certified checks and drafts clear in one day. /d. at 5-6. 
NSCC and DTC propose to switch to a same-day funds settlement system whereby all 
payments to or from members and participants arising from securities transactions would 
be made by funds transfers through Fedwire. /d. at 1, 5-6. Such a "same-day funds 
settlement system" currently is offered by NSCC and DTC only for commercial paper 
trades. /d. at 5. 
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Two factors justify the traders' interest in a funds transfer law that 
promotes high speed transfers: minimizing credit risk and maximizing 
funds availability. ''Funds transfer services are used primarily by 
depository institutions and their corpomte customers to make very large 
time-critical dollar payments."147 With respect to credit risk, unless 
delivery is made against payment, one party assumes the risk of default 
of the counterparty. Where delivery of foreign exchange or a financial 
instrument occurs before payment, the seller-payee assumes the credit risk 
of the buyer. The more quickly payment is received, the shorter the credit 
risk exposure. The failure of Herstatt after U.S. dollars were credited to 
its account, but before it had delivered foreign exchange to its 
counterparty, illustrates that exposure for even a few hours entails 
potentially disastrous consequences.148 
With regard to funds availability, delays in settling payment 
obligations impede rapid responses to changing market conditions and 
may be costly.149 Tmders are not long-term investors. Their positions 
147 PAYMENT SYs"IEMs, supra note 98, at 219-20. 
141 See Delbrueck & Co. v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., 609 F.2d 1047, 1049-50 
(2d Cir.1979); see also supra notes 73-87 and accompanying text (discussing Delbrueck). 
Indeed, the innD.ediate past President of the Federal Reserve Bank of New Y orlc 
highlighted intra-day credit risks and argued that the payments system is a means of 
extending credit, akin to traditional bank lending: 
An economic system and a financial system can only be as efficient and as safe 
as its payments system. In tum, the efficiency and safety of the payments 
system rests importantly on the extent to which the maker or recipient of a 
payment for a good, a service, or a financial transaction has confidence that the 
payment can and will be honored since this process-by its very nature-entails 
timing gaps ofvmying lengths. In tum, these timing gaps necessarily imply that 
the process of making and receiving payment is the process of extending credit, 
even if that credit is extended only for a day or an hour. In short, the payments 
system as we know it today is a credit system. 
PATRlKIS, BAXIER & BHALA, supra note 6, at 211 (quoting E. GERALD CORRIGAN, 
FINANCIAL MARKET STRUC11JRE: A LoNGER VIEW {1987)). Corrigan's point is that parties 
to financial transactions send and receive payments instructions for millions or billions 
of dollars and are at risk when there is a gap between funds paid out and funds received. 
If payment obligations are not satisfied on time, then the chain of consequent defaults can 
cause the financial system to crumble. The parties are more likely to proceed in spite of 
these gaps if they have confidence in the health of the payments system, of which the 
applicable legal framework is a significant detenninant 
149 
.Overdraft charges are one such cost. If a trader has committed fimds obtained from 
dealt to dea12 before receiving final settlement in deall, then an overdraft fee may be 
charged. For the first time the Federal Reserve has implemented such charges on an intra-
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in foreign exchange, securities, or money-market instruments turn over 
rapidly as new profitable trading opportunities are seized. Thus, funds 
from a previous transaction must be available for deployment in a new 
transaction. 
The following covered interest arbitrage transaction illustrates the 
point.150 Suppose on Day One a foreign exchange trader observes that 
short-term interest rates in India are higher than those in the United States 
and that the discount of the thirty-day forward151 rupee/dollar rate· 
relative to the spot rupee/dollar rate is insufficient to eliminate a 
profitable interest arbitrage opportunity. Accordingly, on Day One she 
buys rupees for dollars in the spot market, invests the rupees for thirty 
days in India, and buys dollars for rupees in the forward market. She 
must have confidence that the rupees will be delivered on the spot value 
date, which would be Day Three so that they can be invested immediately 
for one month, at the end of which the forward contract matures and the 
rupees must be converted back into dollars. The arbitrage opportunity 
depends on compliailce with exact delivery schedules.152 
What rules in a funds transfer statute facilitate high speed transfers? 
A same-day settlement convention, coupled with rules that facilitate high-
volume, electronic processing of payment orders, are critical elements of 
the law in this regard. 
The same-day funds settlement convention is found in U.C.C. Article 
4A and indirectly in the U.N. Model Law. Section 4A-301(b) of the 
Uniform Commercial Code indicates that unless a payment order states 
otherwise, the day on which a receiving bank must execute the order is 
day basis. Modification of the Payments System Risk Reduction Program; Dayl.igbi 
Overdraft Pricing, 57 Fed. Reg. 47,084 (Oct. 14, 1992) (effective Apr. 14, 1994); 
Modification of the Payments System Risk Reduction Program; Measurement of Daylight 
Overdrafts, 57 Fed. Reg. 47,093 (Oct. 14, 1992) (effective Oct. 14, 1993). 
150 See generally GUNTER. DuFEY & IAN H. GIDDY, THE INTERNATIONAL MONEY 
MARKET 61-71 (1978) (studying the relationship between foreign exchange markets and 
Eurocurrency interest rates). 
151 A forward foreign exchange contract is virtually identical to a spot foreign 
contract, supra note 36, except that the date fixed for delivery of the underlying 
currencies is more than two days (and generally between one week and two years) from 
the date of the contract. 
152 Note that while exchange rates are notorious for quick and dramatic movements, 
the need for rapid delivery is not premised on such movements. The rate at which a spot 
or forward deal is made is established on the trade date, not the value date. DuFEY & 
GIDDY, Sllpra note 150, at 63. 
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the day that the order is received.153 Article Eleven of the U.N. Model 
Law does not strictly require the receiving bank to execute a payment 
order on the day of receipt 154 However, if it executes on a later date, 
then it must give value as of the date of receipt Iss In practice, this is 
likely to mean that a receiving bank that receives an order on Day One 
but executes on Day Two must pass one day's interest on to the next 
party in the fimds transfer chain. 
Rules that encourage rapid payment order processing are more pro-
nounced in U.C.C. Article 4A than the U.N. Model Law. Whereas Article 
4A unequivocally relieves the duty of a receiving bank to manua11y check 
a payment order for discrepancies between account names (described in 
words) and account numbers (described in figures), the U.N. Model Law 
does not provide this relief.156 The nature and scope of a receiving 
bank's duties with respect to handling payment orders are less clear under 
the U.N. Model Law than under U.C.C. Article 4A Accordingly, a 
receiving bank is more likely to incur liability for wrongfully processing 
a payment order that contains a discrepancy if the bank is subject to the 
U.N. Model Law. This is at odds with the traders' interest in high-speed 
fimds transfers, as receiving banks may be forced to manua11y check for 
discrepancies. 
However, a fast payments mechanism is not enough for the traders, 
as they need a low-cost mechanism as well. The price of settling a 
transaction can wipe out the slim profit margin on which the trader 
sometimes operates. The spread between a purchase and subsequent sale 
of ten million pounds against U.&. dollars may be only one-tenth of a 
153 U.C.C. § 4A-301(b) (1990). 
154 UN. MODEL LAW art. 11(1). 
155 Id. art. 11(2). 
156 Compare U.C.C. §§ 4A-207(b)(1), 4A-208(b)(1) (beneficiary's bank or receiving 
bank may rely on the account number, as there is~ duty to detemrine whether name and 
nmnber match) with U.N. MODEL LAw arts. 8, 10(4) (requiring notice when discrepancies 
are found by receiving bank or beneficiary's bank). Article 8 of the UN. Model Law, 
unlike U.C.C. § 4A-208(b)(1), makes no reference to misdescriptions of an intenni:diary 
bank or beneficiary's bank. Thus, a receiving bank operating under U.C.C. § 4A-208(b)(1) 
clearly has no duty to detect .misdescriptions. Article 8(4) of the U.N. Model Law, by 
contrast, speaks of insufficient information in a payment order, but does not plainly spell 
out the bank's duties in detecting discrepancies. Article 10(4) indicates that when a 
beneficiary's bank detects an inconsistency, it must take COll'eC!ive measures, but it does 
not indicate whether the bank has a duty to check for inconsistencies. In contrast, U.C.C. 
§ 4A-207(b)(1) does not impose such a duty. 
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cent, and the spread between a sale and subsequent purchase of commer-
cial paper may be only one-half of a basis point.157 
Liability rules in funds transfer statutes address the traders' interest in 
low cost. Legal liabilities are impediments in that the more onerous the 
liabilities are on banks which provide funds transfer services, the more 
likely that banks will increase the fees for these services.158 Increased 
fees, in turn, represent increased transaction costs. U.C.C. Article 4A is 
more successful at delimiting the liabilities of receiving banks. Conse-
quential damages are generally not recoverable unless the bank agrees in 
writing to assume such liability.159 In contrast, the U.N. Model Law 
allows for any remedies provided by any applicable law where a 
receiving bank fails to execute a payment order or improperly executes 
the order, if the bank acted with specific intent to cause loss or acted 
recklessly and with knowledge that loss would result.160 
2. The Settlements Department's Interest: 
Certainty Manifested in Four Ways 
Traders communicate the terms of their deal, including payment 
instructions, to their respective settlements departments (commonly 
referred to as ''back offices"), which then confirm the terms and 
conditions of the deaL For example, the practice in the spot and forward 
foreign exchange markets and the over-the-counter. foreign exchange 
options market is that the deal is negotiated and concluded by telephone 
and confirmed in writing by the back offices of the trading parties.161 
157 One basis point is 0.01 percent. NORMAN D. MOORE, DICITONARY OF BUSINESS 
FINANCE & INVESTMENT 35 (h"b. ed. 1975). 
151 Theoretically, this is not the only poSSl"ble economic response. It is conceivable 
that competition could cause banks to deliver the same service at the same cost with 
lower risk. 
159 U.C.C. § 4A-305(c). 
160 UN. MODEL LAW art. 18. 
161 See, e.g., Raj Bbala, Preliminary Summaty of Findings of Survey on Foreign 
Exchange Trading Practices (Jan. 26, 1993) (on file with author) (summarizing foreign 
exchange trading practices for nine European countries, Japan, and Australia); Lawyers 
Group of the Foreign Exchange Committee, International Foreign Exchange Master 
Agreement (1993) (on file with author) (used for spot and forward foreign exchange 
con1racts); British Bankers' Association and Foreign Exchange Committee, International 
Currency Options Marlcet (ICOM) Master Agreement and Guide (Apr. 1992) [hereinafter 
ICOM Agreement]. 
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Without a routine system for clearmgt62 and setttmgt63 each trade, 
trading activity would grind to a halt The back office of the bank that 
employs the trader formulates and executes clearing and settlement 
1~ Clearing refers to "the process whereby the 1rades are compared, matched, and 
confumed." Charles W. Mooney, Jr., Beyond Negotiability: A New Model for Transfer 
and Pledge of Interests in Securities Controlled by Intermediaries, 12 CARDOZO L. REv.· 
305, 316 (1990). It involves "capturing the 1rade data, comparing the buyer's and seller's 
version of the data, and guaranteeing that the 1rade will settle once the data match." 1990 
GAO REPoRT, supra note 138, at 10. 
163 Settlement "is the process whereby parties to 1rades fulfill their obligations 
thereunder-generally a 'delivery' of the securities [or, in the case of a foreign exchange 
deal, the appropriate foreign exchange] by the seller and payment of the agreed price by 
the buyer." Mooney, supra note 162, at 316-17 (citations omitted). Settlement involves 
the exchange of funds and/or financial instruments between the trading parties: 'Those 
who owe money and/or financial instruments make payments or deliveries. Those who 
are owed money and/or securities receive the funds or securities." 1990 GAO REPoRT, 
supra note 138, at 10. Using the tenn "settlement'' in the second level of the inverted 
pyramid raises the issue of whether there is an overlap between the second and third 
levels of the pyramid. The second level involves clearing, settlement, and custody matters. 
The focus is on confinning a transaction. payment instructions, and the transfer of 
ownership claims to financial instruments. In contrast, the third level involves funds 
transfers-the focus is squarely on the electronic transfer of bank credit, but this level 
pertains to a specific means of settling a payment obligation (a funds transfer) and a 
specific funds transfer system (Fedwire or CHIPS). "Settlement'' as used in the context 
of the second level is generic. It includes payment methods such as cash, negotiable 
instrument, letter of credit, and funds transfer, which are all conceivable means of 
settlement, even though funds transfers may be the most commonly used method and/or 
the most significant in tenns of the volmne of financial transactions settled. For instance, 
payment for some securities, such as book-entry U.S. Treasury securities, is made through 
delivery-versus-payment. In other words, the electronic delivery of the securities and the 
electronic transfer of funds occur simultaneously. Alternatively, other securities, such as 
some of those that are cleared through the NSCC and held in custody at the DTC, may 
be paid for by cashier's check. At the second level of the pyramid there is no distinction 
between these alternatives. By contrast, at the third level of the pyramid, only one method 
of settlement and the law that govems it is seen: a funds transfer. 
The justification for distinguisbing the second and third levels in this manner is, in 
part, a practical one. Funds transfers, in tenns of the volume of payments transactions and 
amount of dollars, are enmmously more significant than other means of payment. See 
PAYMENT SYsTEMs, supra note 98, at215-25. Everyday, payment obligations arising from 
millions of transactions representing billions of dollars are satisfied through funds 
transfers. Anecdotal evidence also explains the distinction. Considerable effort is 
expended by financial institution supervisors, namely the Federal Reserve, on matters 
pertaining to funds transfers. The important role played by Federal Reserve representatives 
in drafting U.C.C. Article 4A and the U.N. Model Law illustrates the perceived 
importance of funds transfer law. See U.C.C. § 4A-102 cmt. (1990) (presenting a general 
drafting histoty of Article 4A). 
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processes.164 Because these must accommodate with precision a high 
volume of trades in short periods, certainty is valued in a funds transfer 
law in four ways: payment order processing, finality of payment, 
discharge, and interloper fraud prevention.165 Remember that in each 
instance, the back office (or more correctly, the financial institution of 
which the back office is a part) acts as a receiving bank in a funds 
transfer.166 
The traders' back office demands certainty or, more specifically, 
routine and predictability. To accommodate· growth in trading activity, the 
back office must be capable of processing a large number of instructions 
relating to the payment obligations arising from large financial transac-
tions in a short time period. Every time a trader buys foreign exchange, 
short-term money market instruments, or corporate securities, or makes 
or repays an interbank loan, the trader instructs her back office to 
164 More generally, the players at the second level of the inverted pyramid are 
clearing, settlement, and custodial facilities of banks. They range from the back office of 
the trader's financial institution to sophisticated clearing, settlement, and depositoty 
facilities in which several institutions participate. Because the focus of this Article is on 
settling payment obligations and not on the mechanisms for transferring ownership claims 
to specific financial instruments or on the custody of those instruments, the sophisticated 
facilities are not highlighted. See generally EGoN GunMAN, MODERN SECURITIES 
TRANsFERS (3d ed. 1989) (discussing all aspects of the law of securities transfers); 
Charles W. Mooney, Jr., Property, Credit, and Regulation Meet Information Technology: 
Qearance and Settlement in the Securities Markets, 55 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 131, 
135-39 (1992) (describing the clearing and settlement process in U.S. securities matkets). 
Among the principal u.s. clearing and settlement systems for financial instruments are 
the NSCC (cotporate equities), the Options Clearing Corporation (options contracts), and 
the Board of Trade Clearing Corporation (futures contracts). See 1990 GAO REPoRT, 
supra note 138, at 12-14 (stock, options, and futures transactions). The Federal Reserve's 
book-entry system is the clearing, settlement, and custodial facility for U.S. Treasmy 
obligations. See FED. REsERVE BANK OF N.Y., FEDPOINTS 5: BOOK-ENTRY PROCEDURE 
(Oct. 1986). Among the principal offshore facilities are FX NET (through which 
participants bilaterally net their spot and forward foreign exchange trades for the same 
currency and v8Iue date) and Euroclear and Cedel (the depository and settlement 
organi711tions for the long-term intemational bond market and. the short-term Euro-note 
market). See PAYMENT SYSTEMS IN EC MEMBER STATES, supra note 125, at 294-95. 
165 See infra notes 167-83 and accompanYing text. This is not to suggest that the value 
of certainty is unimportant in laws goveming other payment mechanisms. Indeed, U.C.C. 
§ 1-102 (1990) suggests that the U.C.C. should be ''liberally construed and applied to 
promote its underlYing purposes and policies." Id. Certainty is a relevant consideration 
of interested parties in check processing. See, e.g., id. §§ 4-301 to 4-303 (relating to 
check collection and payor banks). However, because funds transfers are used to settle 
large financial transactions in a short period of time, certainty takes on distinct 
manifestations and meanings in the context of funds transfers. 
166 See supra note 71 (defining "receiving bank''). 
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generate a payment order to send funds to the trading counterparty. Every 
time the trader sells in one of these markets or receives repayment of an 
interbank loan, the back office is instructed to receive funds from the 
trading counterparty. In addition, the back office may be an intermediary 
between two trading parties neither of which is employed by the same 
institution. For example, the Bank of Baroda in India may buy U.S. 
dollars in exchange for Indian rupees through Westpac Bank in Australia 
in a spot foreign exchange transaction and the transfer of dollars may be 
routed through Security Pacific Bank in Los Angeles ("SecPac"). While 
no trader at SecPac is involved in the dollar/rupee deal, SecPac's back 
office, or funds transfer department, is involved in facilitating its 
execution. In all of these cases, the back office must efficiently handle the 
mishaps that sometimes occur in a funds transfer, such as a misdescrip-
tion of a party in a payment order or an incomplete funds transfer. 
To properly route a payment order, a receiving bank must know the 
party in the funds transfer chain to which the order should be sent. This 
party, either an intermediary bank/67 the beneficiary's bank,168 or the 
beneficiary, 169 is frequently descnbed in the payment order in two 
ways: by account name (described in words) and account number 
(described in figures). The sender of the order might descnbe the party 
inconsistently. For example, the sender may tell the receiving bank to 
send the order to "Citibank" whose account number is 12345 when, in 
fact, Citlbank's number is 12346. 
U.C.C. Article 4A allows a receiving bank to rely on the numerical 
description of an intermediary bank, the beneficiary's bank, and/or the 
beneficiary contained in a payment order when routing the order, even if 
there is an inconsistent description in words provided the receiving bank 
is unaware of the .inconsistency.170 Moreover, the receiving bank has no 
duty to check for inconsistencies.''' In effect, the back office can 
process payment orders based on account numbers without worrying 
about potential inconsistencies. The U.N. Model Law is far less clear on 
these points. It does not unequivocally remove the burden of checking for 
167 See supra note 104 {defining ''intermediacy bank''). 
161 The "beneficiaty•s bank'• is "the bank identified in a payment order in which an 
account of the beneficiaiy is to be credited pursuant to the order ... U.C.C. § 4A-103(a)(3); 
see supra notes 100. 113 and accompanying text. 
169 See supra note 50 (defining ''beneficialY'). 
170 /d.§ 4A-207(b)(1) (concerning an inconsistency in a payment order between the 
account name and nmnber describing the beneficiaiy); id. § 4A-208(b)(1) (concerning an 
inconsistency in a payment order between the account name and nmnber describing the 
intermediacy bank or beneficiaty•s bank where the sender of the order is a bank). 
171 U.C.C. § 4A-208(b)(1). 
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inconsistencies from receiving banks, nor does it clearly state that they 
are entitled to rely on account nwnbers instead of account names in 
payment orders.172 Accordingly, in this area, the U.N. Model Law does 
not afford the same degree of certainty to receiving banks. 
Processing payment orders is not the only context in which certainty 
is valued When the back office is receiving funds on behalf of a trader 
or the bank, finality of payment is important-such as when a trader 
informs her back office that funds will be sent by a counterparty as a 
result of a sale by the trader to the counterparty of foreign exchange, 
short-term money market instruments, or corporate securities. Finality of 
payment is also important when the trader expects to receive repayment 
of a short-term interbank loan previously extended to the counterparty. 
The back office, as well as the trader or bank, must know when funds 
credited to an account maintained or used by the trader or her bank are 
final and irrevocable, because only then are the funds available without 
reservation. 
The receiver finality rule ofU.C.C. Article 4A directly addresses this 
problem. Once the beneficiary's bank has paid the beneficiary, the 
payment is final. Payment by the beneficiary's bank to the beneficiary 
cannot be made provisionally or subject to a right to recover payment 
from the beneficiary.173 Payment occurs when the beneficiary's bank 
credits the beneficiary's bank account and notifies the beneficiary of the 
right to withdraw the credit.174 In stark contrast, the U.N. Model Law· 
does not contain a receiver finality rule. Therefore, a back office 
receiving funds in a funds transfer subject to the U.N. Model Law is not 
provided with certainty on the matter of finality of payment. 
The need for certainty is also manifest when discharge becomes an 
issue during the transfer of funds by the back office. The back office 
needs to know when the payment obligation that spawns the funds 
transfer is discharged Only then does liability for payment based on the 
underlying financial contract end This concern will arise whe~ for 
example, a trader instructs the back office to pay funds to a ~ounterparty 
as a result of purchasing foreign exchange, a short-term money market 
instrument, or corporate securities from the counterparty, or when the 
trader is extending or repaying a short-term interbank obligation. 
172 See UN. MODEL LAw arts. 8 (containing obligation of a receiving bank other than 
the beneficiary's bank); id. art. 10 (containing obligations of beneficiary's bank). 
173 U.C.C. § 4A-405(c). 
174 Id. § 4A-405(a). Payment also occurs when the beneficiary's bank credits the 
account of the beneficiary and then ''lawfully applies the credit to a debt of the 
beneficiary," id., or othelwise makes funds available to the beneficiary. Id. 
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Both the U.C.C. and the U.N. Model Law contain a rule on dis-
charge, and the rules are substantively similar.175 Upon acceptance of 
a payment order by the beneficiary's bank on behalf of the beneficiary, 
the funds transfer is completed176 and the originator's underlying 
obligation to pay funds to the beneficiary is discharged. Acceptance by 
the beneficiary's bank and payment to the beneficiary are closely linked 
in that payment occurs when the bank accepts an order for the benefit of 
the beneficiary.177 
The converse to the discharge rules is the money-back gua.rantee.178 
There must be an answer to the problem of incomplete transfers, which 
occur when the beneficiary's bank does not, for whatever reason, accept 
a payment order on behalf of the beneficiary. Both statutes attempt to 
address the matter by assuring each sender in the funds transfer chain that 
it will obtain a refund, with interest, of any payment made for a payment 
order.179 
The final manifestation of the back office's need for certainty is the 
prevention of interloper fraud. This arises when the back office is 
instructed to send a payment order on behalf of a trader as a result of a 
financial market transaction entered into by the trader. A threat exists that 
a wrongdoer will instruct the back office to issue a payment order in the 
name of a trader or the trader's institution, and the wrongdoer might be 
an employee of the institution. The back office must be able to discern 
bona fide payment orders from unauthorized and fraudulent orders. 
The U.C.C. and the U.N. Model Law rules on interloper fraud should 
be seen in the light of the interests of the back office.180 Both statutes 
implement the concept of a . "commercially · reasonable"181 security 
procedure that is designed to test the authenticity of payment orders 
received.182 The general rule is that if a receiving bank and sender agree 
to such a procedure and the bank follows it, then the sender is liable for 
175 U.C.C. § 4A-406; UN. MODEL LAW art. 19. 
176 U.C.C. § 4A-104(a); U.N. MODEL LAW art. 19(1). 
177 U.C.C. § 4A-406(a); UN. MODEL LAw art. 9(1)(d). 
171 U.C.C. § 4A-402(d); UN. MODEL LAW art. 14(1). 
179 A limited exception applies in cases where a sender designated the use of a 
particular intennedimy bank that subsequently failed. Such a sender is not entitled to the 
money-back guarantee. It bears the risk of loss arising from the collapse of a bank that 
it selected. U.C.C. § 4A-402(e); U.N. MODEL LAw art. 14(3). 
110 U.C.C. §§ 4A-201 to 4A-203; UN. MoDEL LAw art. 5. These intricate rules are 
explained in detail in PATRIKIS, BAXTER & BHALA, supra note 6, at 39-51 (U.C.C. art. 
4A rules); id. at 272-75 (UN. Model Law rules). 
111 U.N. MODEL LAW art. 5(2)(a). 
1
1l U.C.C. §§ 4A-201, 4A-203; UN. MODEL LAW art. 5. 
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any payment order issued in its name and accepted in accordance with the 
procedure, even if the order was sent by a wrongdoer.183 Because the 
procedure must be "commercially reasonable" in order to absolve the 
receiving bank of liability, there is some uncertainty as to whether a court 
would hold that a particular procedure meets this standard However, 
industry custom and practice (i.e., the nature of the security procedures 
used by other receiving banks) may afford greater certainty to receiving 
banks. 
3. The Funds Trarufer System's Interest: 
Reducing Systemic Risk 
The vast sums transferred daily over the principal funds transfer 
networks are associated with wholesale transactions among sophisticated 
financial institutions.184 The existence and importance of funds transfer 
systems derive largely from the use of funds transfers as a method of 
payment in a broad range of domestic and international financial market 
transactions.185 After the trader has entered into a financial deal and 
communicated a payment instruction to her back office, that office sends 
or receives payment orders from other banks via a particular funds 
transfer system. If U.S. dollars are transferred, then the Fedwire or ClllPS 
systems will most likely be used 186 
Membership and participation in these systems is comprised of many 
of the same financial institutions, namely, banks, that employ traders and 
settlements personnel 187 The member-participants have a critical 
collective interest: reducing systemic risk Specifically, the credit risk 
113 U.C.C. § 4A-203; U.N. MODEL LAW art. 5. 
114 See supra notes 6-35 and accompanying text. 
115 See supra notes 6-35, 45-111 and accompanying text. With respect to the two 
principal U.S. funds transfer systems: 
Fedwire is used principally for domestic payments, while over 70 percent 
of CIDPS payments are dollar-denominated intemational payments. For 
example, Fedwire is used for interbank overnight loans, interbank settlement 
transactions, eotporate-to-cozporate payments, and settlement of security 
transactions. In contrast, CIDPS is used to settle foreign exchange transactions 
and Eurodollar placements. 
PAYMENT SYSTEMS, supra note 98, at 220 (emphasis added). 
116 See supra notes 11-12 and accompanying text. 
117 It should be noted that securities finns, which obviously have trading and 
settlements fimctions, do not have direct access to Fedwire (i.e., they do not participate 
in Fedwire) and very few are CIDPS participants. See irifi'a note 188 (discussing access 
to Fedwire). 
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associated with one participant should not become a systemic risk 
problem. Participants in a funds transfer system-commercial banks and 
other depositm:y institutions188-are legitimately concerned about the 
ability of each net debtor participant in the system to settle its payment 
obligations at or before the end of the funds transfer business day.189 If 
one or a few net debtors fail, then this should not cause liquidity. 
problems for, or insolvencies of: other participants: 
The increased interdependence of the securities markets and the various 
payment systems, coupled with the globalization of the securities 
markets, raises the issue of the growing danger of systemic risk in 
payment systems. This is the risk that one or more participants in a 
payment system will be unable to meet their obligations when due and 
thus cause other participants to be subsequently unable to meet theirs. 
Of the various kinds of risk to which banks may become exposed 
through the accelerated use of the new technology, it is this systemic 
risk that is the greatest cause for concern.190 
Settlement guarantees are one way of assuring that the system closes 
each day with all creditors' payments claims satisfied. Through a 
payments netting scheme, 191 a second technique, the risk of a settlement 
10 Under the Monetmy Con1rol Act of 1980, "depositoty institutions" (''Dis'') are 
allowed access to Fedwire. 12 U.S.C. § 248(o) (1980). There are thousands of Dis with 
on-line direct computer access to Fedwire and many smaller Dis with off-line access. See 
PATIUKIS, BAXTER & BHALA, supra note 6, at 11, 184. There are 122 CHIPS participants, 
including many of the world's largest banks. Id. at 11; PAYMENT SYSTEMS, supra note 98, 
at 224. 
119 The ''funds transfer business day'' of a receiving bank is the part of the day during 
which it is open to receive, process, and transmit payment orders, as well as cancellations 
and amendments thereof. U.C.C. § 4A-105(a)(4). CHIPS is a same-day funds settlement 
system where settlement occurs at the end of the day on the books of the Federal Reserve 
Bank of New York on the basis of multilateral netting of payment obligations. See supra 
note 12. Multilateral netting refers to "a netting System in which direct participants settle 
only their net net positions resulting from the clearing process." PAYMENT SYSTEMS IN 
EC MEMBER. STATES, supra note 125, at 326. Fedwire is a same-day funds settlement 
system where settlement occurs instantaneously. See supra note 11. A net debtor 
participant in a system is one who, as a result of payment orders sent and received during 
the day that are netted on a bilateral or multilateral basis, has a net payment obligation 
to its counteiparty (under a bilateral netting ammgement) or to the system (under a 
multilateral netting ammgement). See PATIUKIS, BAXTER & BHALA, supra note 6, parts 
III-IV (explaining CHIPS and Fedwire operations); see also LAMFALUSSY REPORT, supra 
note 84 (reviewing netting schemes). 
190 PAYMENT SYSTEMS, supra note 98, at 2-3. 
191 Netting is a complicated and rapidly evolving topic. The single most important 
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failure of one participant in a funds transfer system causing a chain 
reaction of liquidity crises and failures of other participants is reduced, 
assuming that there is receiver finality. 192 Players in the financial 
markets who understand that they can net payment obligations on a 
bilateral or multilateral basis with their counterparties will appreciate that 
larger volumes of trading activity and larger transaction values can be 
safely accommodated The risk of non-payment by a counterparty will not 
rise in proportion to the credit exposure to that counterparty if a netting 
scheme is implemented Credit exposure will depend on the number of 
trades and the amount of each trade executed with the counterparty. The 
number of settlement transactions arising from the trades will be reduced 
by fifty percent if a bilateral netting scheme is implemented193 and by 
eighty percent if multilateral netting is used 194 Settlement risk is 
reduced because the number and amount of funds transfers is reduced 
through netting. In sum, assuming financial market players operate 
rationally and with substantial information, they are likely to internalize 
reductions in systemic risk.195 In tum, the macroeconomic purpose of 
fostering growth and development in financial markets will be served 
For pragmatic reasons, systemic risk reduction is shared by the bank 
regulators, principally the Federal Reserve, that examine the participants 
and the system. Regulators are a hidden interest group in the third level 
of the pyramid They understandably want to avoid a major settlement 
failure that would necessitate a bail out. If a participant cannot settle a 
large net debit position, then the ripple effect of this failure could weaken 
that participant's counterparties, who were relying on the settlement to 
fund their payment obligations. As the "lender of last resort," the Federal 
Reserve could be called upon to provide liquidity to the net debtor 
participant and/or its counterparties to limit the systemic repercus-
sions.196 
source of infonnation and guidance for central bankers and other policy makers remains 
the LAMFALUSSY REPORT, supra note 84. . 
191 In other words, assuming that net settlement payments are final. 
193 ld. ~ 2.4, at 11. 
194 Id. ~ 2.12, at 13. 
195 Assume that an individual player that has sold foreign exchange or a financial 
instrument observes that receipt of final payment by funds transfer is essentially 
guaranteed because of abnonnal settlement rules such as those in CHIPS Rule 13. See 
CHIPS RULES, supra note 12, at 4-11. From that player's perspective, the guarantee is 
intemaiized in that it becomes an incentive to choose a funds transfer over other means 
of payment. See generally Coleman, supra note 54, at 221, 231-32 (defining external 
effects and externalities). 
196 As the lender of last resort, as well as a regulator of many CHIPS and all Fedwire 
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Financial institutions that cooperate to form and participate in a funds 
transfer system lay down rules for entry and participation.197 The 
relationship between these rules and funds transfer law is of critical 
interest to the participants. First, funds transfer law must recognize the 
existence of funds transfer systems and their rules. Funds transfer 
legislation that neglects these systems and rules ignores the reality of the 
funds transfer market Second, the law should address what Professor 
Scott has dubbed the ''third party problem"198-to what extent, if any, 
can system rules bind non-participants? Third, and most important, funds 
transfer law should support the efforts of system participants to minimize 
systemic risk by allowing system rules to vary inconsistent provisions in 
the law. For instance, CHIPS participants have agreed to net payment 
obligations on a multilateral basis and to provide collateral and settlement 
guarantees to minimize systemic risk.199 However, these privately 
negotiated rules are useful only if they are not undermined by specific 
rules in U.C.C. Article 4A or the U.N. Model Law. A rigid receiver 
finality rule, which back offices might favor, might discourage the 
development of abnormal settlement procedures. Similarly, efforts to 
expand the use of netting in foreign exchange markets through master 
agreements that call for nettini00 or through new central clearing and 
settlement facilities2°1 require the support of funds transfer law at least 
in the form of an ability to vary inconsistent provisions by agreement 
The status of funds transfer system rules under U.C.C. Article 4A is 
relatively clear in that each provision of the statute is variable by a funds 
transfer system rule, unless the contrary is indicated. 202 The rule may 
be effective even if it indirectly affects a non-consenting party.203 It 
may directly govern the rights and obligations of parties other than the 
participants, the Federal Reserve's discount window would be a critical source of liquidity 
for a failing participant in a funds transfer system. See 12 C.F.R. § 201.1-.110 (1993) 
(relating to discount window operations). To the extent that the system can contain the 
adverse effects of failure, emergency lending operations are unnecessmy. 
197 See, e.g., CHIPS RULES, supra note 12; PATRIKIS, BAXTER & BHALA, supra note 
6, part IV. 
191 HAL S. SCOIT, NEW PAYMENT SYsTEMs: A REPoRT TO THE 3-4-8 COMMIITEE OF 
THE PERMANENT EDITORIAL BOARD FOR THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 40 (1978). 
199 CHIPS RULES, supra note 12, at 12-13 (Rule 15). 
200 For an example of such a master agreement, see !COM Agreement, supra note 
161. 
201 See PAYMENT 8YSTEMS IN EC MEMBER STATES, supra note 125, at 294 
(discussing the Exchange Clearing House Organization ("ECHO'')). 
202 U.C.C. § 4A-501(b) (1990). 
203 /d. 
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financial institutions that participate in the funds transfer system if such 
parties are given notice of the use of the system to effect the transfer and 
the system's rules.204 The status of a funds transfer system rule is not 
as clear under the U.N. Model Law as under U.C.C. Article 4A The term 
"funds transfer system rule" is hardly ever used in the U.N. Model 
Law/05 as "funds transfer systems" are not discussed. While many of 
the U.N. Model Law articles are variable by agreement/06 the U.N. 
Model Law does not indicate whether rules promulgated by a funds 
transfer system constitute an "agreement'' for this purpose. 
The ability to opt out of a provision in a funds transfer statute may 
serve a secondary purpose for system participants: competitive advantage. 
Because the U.S. funds transfer market is dominated by Fedwire and 
CHIPS, it is tempting to characterize these providers of wholesale wire 
transfer services as natural monopolies.207 Arguably, there is competi-
tion between the two giants, in which case system rules are a competitive 
variable. Like any other private sector business, a funds transfer system 
must remain competitive and profitable. CHIPS, owned and operated by 
commercial banks, competes directly with Fedwire for the funds transfer 
business generated by trading activity in the foreign exchange markets, 
short-term money markets, and securities markets.208 Both are essential-
ly privately organized systems that operate under the auspices of 
applicable funds transfer law.209 
204 Id. §§ 4A-501(b), 4A-507(c). 
205 U.N. MODEL LAW art. 6(b)(iv)(a) (concerning bilateral and multilateral netting and 
the identification of when payment is made). This is the only instance where the tennis 
used. 
206 Id. art. 4. 
207 See, e.g., Scorr, supra note 198, at 35-36 (''Wire transfer is highly concentrated 
in . . . Fedwire."). A natural monopolist is a producer for which unit costs decline at 
every level of output (i.e., there are economies of scale in production); thus a larger 
producer can sell at a lower price than a smaller producer. ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS 
ULEN, LAW AND EcoNOMICS 97 {1988). 
201 CHIPS and Fedwire are ''funds transfer systems" under U.C.C. § 4A-105(a)(5), 
though Fedwire is accorded somewhat unique treatment under the statute. See U.C.C. § 
4A-105 cmt. 3. 
w Fedwire cannot be considered a government service in the classic sense because 
the Federal Reserve Banks that own and operate Fedwire are instrumentalities of an 
independent federal agency providing a private service-the Board of Govemors of the 
Federal Reserve System. Nor does Fedwire pose externality problems associated with 
public goods, because only depositoiy institutions that sign written agreements with their 
local Reserve Bank can send and receive payment orders directly to and from Reserve 
Banks. See, e.g., OPERATING CIRCULAR No. 8, supra note 112, at ~ 1. A public good is 
one "for which there is no rivahy in consumption and for which the costs to a private 
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Viewed in this way, there is a consistency between the competitive 
interests of a fimds transfer system on the one hand and the interests of 
traders and their back offices on the other. Competitive advantage is gained 
by one system over another in part by providing faster, cheaper, and more 
secure means of transferring bank credit, all of which appeal to traders and/or 
their back offices. In addition, one system can gain a competitive advantage 
by offering rules that more effectively reduce systemic risk. 
CONCLUSION 
What is the pmpose of the new and complex body offimds transfer law? 
This Article argues that the law should serve the interests of three distinct 
players in the financial markets: the traders and back offices of major 
commeroial and investment banks, as well as the fimds transfer systems used 
by these banks. Funds transfer law is neither a backstop to private agreement 
nor a response to the common law. Consumer protection is an equally 
unsatisfying justification. Funds transfer law and domestic and international 
financial markets are inextricably linked because wire transfers are commonly 
used to settle payment obligations arising from financial market deals. Funds 
transfer law must not be seen in a vacuum, and financial market growth and 
development must not be viewed as the province of securities regulation, 
banking law, and commodity law. A concern for the health of domestic and 
international financial markets necessitates a concern for fimds transfer law. 
Checks as a means of settling payment obligations in the markets for 
foreign exchange, short-term money market instruments, interbank lending, 
corporate securities, and derivative products cannot satisfy the interests of the 
players. Traders require a high-speed, low-cost means of settlement. They 
seek high-speed transfers in order to maximize availability of fimds and 
minimize credit risk, and low cost in order to preserve slim profit margins. 
Rules on same-day execution and payment order processing potentially satisfy 
their interest in high speed, while limitations on the liability of receiving 
banks for consequential damages potentially satisfy their interest in keeping 
fimds transfer service costs low. 
The concerns of settlements departments include certainty in handling 
payment orders, finality of payment (ie., when fimds received are irrevoca-
ble), and discharge (ie., when an obligation is legally paid). Rules on 
payment order processing, receiver finality, discharge, and a money-back 
supplier of excluding non-paying beneficiaries are high." COOTER & ULEN, supra note 
207, at 108. Securities finns are among the potential rivals for consumption of Fedwire 
services. Under the Monetary Control Act of 1980, Reserve Banks are able to exclude 
non-depositozy institutions. 12 U.S.C. § 248(o) (1980). 
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guarantee potentially satisfy these interests. The back office also is at the 
battlefront against interloper fraud, and legally sanctioned security 
procedures that efficiently allocate risk are critical. Fraud prevention rules 
must address these interests. 
The commercial and investment banks that participate in and utilize 
a funds transfer system have a shared interest in lowering systemic risk. 
Their efforts are aided if funds transfer law is variable by agreement. A 
funds transfer statute should accommodate this interest by allowing the 
system's members to engage in binding risk-reduction efforts. This, 
however, involves trade-offs between flexibility on the one hand and risk-
fixing and economies of scale on the other. 
The ultimate success of wire transfer law hinges critically on whether 
specific rules actually satisfy the interests they should be designed to 
serve. The inverted pyramid is only as strong as the foundation on which 
it rests. In tum, robust financial market development is dependent in part 
on the satisfaction of the interests of these key players. If settling 
payment obligations is a slow, costly, uncertain, and risky process, then 
financial market transactions will be stymied. The ultimate aim of a funds 
transfer statute must be to promote larger trading volumes and larger 
transaction sizes in the markets for foreign exchange, short-term 
instruments, corporate securities, derivative products, and interbank 
lending. Achieving this aim depends primarily on the law governing the 
settlement of payment obligations generated in these markets. 
The next step for scholarly research is to test the theory of funds 
transfer law articulated herein. 210 The argument that funds transfer law 
should primarily serve the financial markets must be applied to specific 
provisions ofU.C.C. Article 4A and the U.N. Model Law. The extent to 
which the law satisfies the interests of traders, back offices, and funds 
transfer systems could be gauged by using microeconomic and banking 
tools to critically analyze the relationship of the base of the inverted 
pyramid to the delineated interests of the players in each of the upper 
three levels.211 A complete framework for assessing this fascinating new 
body of law will then exist. 
210 See Bbala, supra note 8. 
211 This is not to suggest that there is a single proper way to explore the link between 
funds transfer law and financial market growth and development. Empirical research is 
one avenue. Swveying securities, derivatives, foreign exchange traders, their back offices, 
and their lawyers is certainly one agreeable method for examining whether the UN. 
Model Law will finnly support the inverted pyramid. The approach here is to use the 
laboratoty-i.e., to develop a hypothetical transaction and analyze the interests of the key 
players. 
